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SUE ON PAY: 





This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance 
the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over 
what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated 
dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to 
mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation. 
In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against 
directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary 
duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article 
insists that such rejection represents a wasted opportunity, and argues that 
Delaware courts should use say on pay litigation to alter how they assess board 
duties related to pay practices for at least three reasons. First, empirical evidence 
suggests that we cannot rely exclusively on say on pay to alter board behavior. 
Second, if Delaware and other state courts fail to respond to calls for better 
regulation of compensation practices, those courts risk further federal intrusion in 
this area, which could undermine private-ordering along with value-enhancing 
experimentation and innovation that can only occur at the state level. Third, say 
on pay votes are an ideal vehicle for increasing state courts’ role not only because 
courts should encourage boards to consider shareholder concerns but also 
because negative say on pay votes may be a critical signal that there is a defect in 
pay policies that needs to be addressed. Instead of being used as a tool to bypass 
fiduciary duty law, say on pay should serve as a springboard for reinvigorating 
such law as it pertains to executive compensation. 
                                                                                                                
    * Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, The George 
Washington University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School.  
Special thanks to Stephen Vladeck, Heather Hughes and the faculty of American University 
Washington College of Law; Roger Fairfax, Michael Selmi, and the faculty at George 
Washington University Law School; as well as Corinna Lain and the faculty at the 
University of Richmond School of Law for their comments and insights on earlier versions 
of this Article. All errors, of course, are mine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Undoubtedly, executive compensation is one of the most controversial 
corporate governance issues in recent years.
1
 Both lawmakers and the general 
public have expressed considerable outrage over what they view as excessive 
executive compensation.
2
 Such outrage not only stems from a belief that there is an 
insufficient link between executive pay and corporate performance but also from 




Although American fury over executive compensation is not new,
4
 it has 
grown considerably amidst the financial crisis. And it has been fueled by stories of 
executives receiving significant pay packages while their companies performed 
poorly or received federal bailout funds.
5
 Some have even insisted that excessive 
executive pay played a role in fueling, or even precipitating, the financial crisis by 
                                                                                                                
    1. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a 
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 201 (1996) (noting that the 
public outcry over CEO pay has no parallel in sports or the movie business); Omari Scott 
Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation 
Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 302 (2009) (“No corporate governance issue captures the 
imagination and frustration of the American public and politicians more than executive 
compensation.”); Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got 
to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. NOM 
Research Paper No. 04-28; European Corporate Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 
44, 2004), available at http://www.cgscenter.org/library/board/remuneration.pdf (“Few 
issues in the history of the modern corporation have attracted the international attention 
garnered by what the largest corporations pay their top executives.”). 
    2. See Michael M. Phillips, The AIG Controversy: ‘Outrage’ Overflows on 
Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Denounce Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4. 
    3. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Banker Bonuses Are 
‘Shameful,’ Obama Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1; see also infra Part I.B. 
    4. See Charles C. Pak, Toward Reasonable Executive Compensation: Outcry 
for Reform and Regulatory Response, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633, 633 (“Executive 
compensation, or more appropriately, the overcompensation of executives, is the 
controversial corporate governance topic of the 1990s.”); Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 29 
(noting that executive compensation became a major political issue in the 1990s); see also 
Harwell Wells, “No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight over Executive 
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 705–07 (2010). 
    5. See THE CONFERENCE BD., THE CONFERENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6–7 (2009) (noting that “[e]xecutive compensation has become 
a flashpoint for [the public’s] frustration and anger” and that the economic crisis “has only 
intensified public anger over executive compensation”), available at http://www.
conference-board.org/pdf_free/execcompensation2009.pdf; Kenneth R. Davis, Taking 
Stock—Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 
419–21 (2010); Aaron Lucchetti & Matthew Karnitschnig, On Street, New Reality on Pay 
Sets in, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at B1 (noting that the five largest Wall Street firms paid 
a total of $26 billion in bonuses in 2008, the same year that their companies lost a combined 
$25.3 billion). 
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incentivizing executives to pursue unjustifiably risky transactions.
6
 Such stories 
accelerated efforts to reform executive pay practices.
7
 
Say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation—
has garnered significant attention and support as a measure for curbing outsized 
executive compensation.
8
 In 2009, the federal government mandated say on pay 
for corporations receiving funding under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”).
9
 As a result, some 300 companies were required to provide annual say 
on pay votes.
10
 In 2010, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd–Frank”) extended this requirement to all public 
companies.
11
 The push to mandate say on pay stems from a belief that it could help 
curtail inappropriate pay packages and practices, while holding directors more 
accountable for their compensation decisions.
12
 
                                                                                                                
    6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 
GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010); Jeremy Ryan Delman, Structuring Say-on-Pay: A Comparative 
Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 583, 584; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation (Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-93, Emory 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-60, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546229. 
    7. See Deborah Solomon & Laura Meckler, Strict Executive-Pay Caps 
Planned—Latest Salvo from Obama Administration Aims to Rein in Firms Receiving 
Federal Aid, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at A3; Stolberg & Labaton, supra note 3 (noting 
President Obama’s reference to Wall Street pay practices as “shameful”); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive 
Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg15.aspx. 
    8. See COMPENSIA, INC., THOUGHTFUL PAY ALERT: SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY 
VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION—A “SAY ON PAY” PRIMER 1–2 (June 22, 2009) 
(noting emphasis on say on pay and its popular appeal), available at 
http://www.compensia.com/tp_alerts/ThoughtfulPay_SayOnPay_0609.pdf; Marcel Kahan 
& Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1034–36 (2010). 
    9. See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012). 
  10. See Robert W. Reeder III, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Compensation 
Disclosure and Shareholder Activism, in HOT ISSUES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2009, at 
139 (2009), available at www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/CompDis_ShareAct25.DOC; Rosanna 
Weaver et al., A Closer Look at Executive Compensation, in RISKMETRICS GROUP 
POSTSEASON REPORT 2009: A NEW VOICE IN GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL POLICYMAKERS SHAPE 
THE ROAD TO REFORM 24, 24 (Oct. 2009), available at https://www.governance
exchange.com/repository/KnowledgeGateway/pubs/2009_PSR_Client_final.PDF.  
  11. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
111-203, sec. 951, § 14, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act] 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2012)). 
  12. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, “SAY ON PAY” SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY 
VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE NEW FRONTIER OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ACTIVISM 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub
2039_1.pdf; Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience 
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 337–50 (2009).  
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Rather than join the numerous voices engaged in the debate over the 
merits of say on pay,
13
 this Article examines how say on pay impacts boards’ 
fiduciary duties. Boards have been at the center of the executive pay controversy 
because they bear responsibility for establishing and approving executive pay.
14
 
Indeed, if executive pay levels are excessive, then boards have inadequately 
performed their obligations in this area. Some commentators even contend that 
changes in CEO compensation will not occur unless boards become more 
accountable.
15
 As a result, reforms often focus on enhancing board responsibility 
and making directors more accountable for their compensation decisions.
16
 For 
purposes of corporate governance, fiduciary duty law represents the primary 
accountability mechanism.
17
 Yet most commentators believe that such law, 
particularly as articulated by Delaware courts, has been an inadequate constraint 
on director behavior.
18
 In the realm of executive compensation, fiduciary duty law 
has played little, if any, role in policing boards. This is because courts afford 
considerable deference to boards’ executive compensation decisions, even 
upholding executive compensation decisions characterized as “sloppy and 
perfunctory.”
19
 Such deference creates the concern that fiduciary duty law has 
                                                                                                                
  13. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 12, at 352–53; Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on 
Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 129–33 (2010). 
  14. See infra Part I.D. 
  15. See Barbara Hansen & Gary Strauss, Companies Think They’re 
Worth . . . $100,000,000, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2006, at 1B (quoting Harvard Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk). 
  16. See infra Part II.B, Part II.C. 
  17. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate 
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1046 (1993) (noting that for most 
scholars, fiduciary duty law enforced through shareholder litigation represents the primary 
means of director accountability). 
  18. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 46 (2004) (“[A]lmost all cases since 
1900 have refused to overturn compensation decisions made by the boards of publicly 
traded firms.”); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to 
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 81–82, 98 (1992) (“In virtually every case since 
the turn of the century, courts have either applied the business judgment rule and endorsed 
the compensation practice, or simply thrown in the towel and refused to deal with the 
problem.”); Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: 
Contractual Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1198 (2011) (noting that Delaware’s 
standard of review had taken Delaware courts and corporate law “largely out of the policing 
picture”); Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 215; Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, 
Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ 
Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 855, 869 (2011). But see Thomas & Wells, supra, 
at 865–80 (pinpointing instances where plaintiffs have had some success in challenging 
executive compensation decisions, though most did not occur in Delaware and did not occur 
at public companies). 
  19. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249, 263 (Del. 2000). 
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done little to ensure that directors comply with their obligation to ensure that 
executives are paid at an appropriate level.
20
 
This Article argues that say on pay can and should address this concern. 
In the wake of say on pay votes, shareholders have filed several lawsuits against 
directors in which they have relied on such votes to suggest that directors have 
breached their fiduciary duties.
21
 Commentators and courts have insisted that 
Dodd–Frank prohibits shareholders from using say on pay to reshape fiduciary 
duty law.
22
 Moreover, commentators almost universally agree that such suits are 
without merit and believe that say on pay does not and should not have any impact 
on directors’ fiduciary duties.
23
 Appearing to confirm this assessment, courts have 
almost universally chosen to dismiss suits in this area.
24
 
This Article insists that courts should choose a different path. To be sure, 
despite efforts aimed at enhancing director accountability for executive 
compensation matters, the combination of executive compensation reforms likely 
increases the difficulty of challenging director decision-making in this area and 
thus of holding directors accountable through fiduciary duty rules.
25
 Nevertheless, 
this Article takes issue with the presumption that such suits should be construed as 
meritless. In fact, recent Delaware jurisprudence strongly suggests that there are 
circumstances (admittedly, very limited) under which shareholders may be 
successful in fiduciary duty actions involving executive compensation.
26
 Then too, 
Dodd–Frank itself does include a provision indicating that such law is not designed 
to alter state fiduciary duty law.
27
 Yet this Article insists that while such a 
provision may be viewed as a prohibition against compelling changes to fiduciary 
duty law, it does not prevent courts from reassessing and reinvigorating such law. 
More importantly, this Article argues that there are three reasons it may 
prove advantageous for Delaware courts to use say on pay litigation to alter the 
manner in which they assess board duties regarding pay. First, although say on pay 
has the potential to alter and improve pay practices, empirical studies suggest that 
it would be inappropriate to rely exclusively on say on pay to check director 
behavior. Thus, fiduciary law is still necessary to cure problematic pay practices. 
Second, if Delaware and other state courts fail to respond to calls for better 
                                                                                                                
  20. Robert E. Scully, Jr., Executive Compensation, the Business Judgment Rule, 
and the Dodd–Frank Act: Back to the Future for Private Litigation, FED. LAW., Jan. 2011, 
at 36, 38. 
  21. See infra Part III.B. 
  22. See, e.g., SARAH A. GOOD ET AL., PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, 
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRMS GAINING STEAM IN NEW WAVE OF SAY-ON-PAY SHAREHOLDER SUITS? 3 
(2012), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/plaintiffs-firms-gaining-steam-in-
new-w-03932/; Order Granting Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss the Compl., Teamsters Local 237 
v. McCarthy, No. 2011-CV-197841 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2011), 2011 WL 4836230 
(indicating that fiduciary duty suits were not supported by Dodd–Frank’s language). 
  23. GOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 1. 
  24. See id. at 2. 
  25. See infra Part III.B. 
  26. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 865. 
  27. See Dodd–Frank Act § 951(c). 
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regulation of compensation practices, those courts risk further federal intrusion in 
this area. Such intrusion could have negative implications because federal 
regulation too often leads to one-size-fits-all solutions while hindering corporate 
innovation and experimentation.
28
 Third, say on pay votes are likely an ideal 
vehicle for increasing state courts’ role not only because courts should encourage 
boards to consider shareholder concerns but also because negative say on pay 
votes may be a critical signal that there is a defect in pay policies that needs to be 
addressed. For these reasons, courts should take the opportunity to use say on pay 
as a springboard for developing a more in-depth assessment of board decision-
making related to compensation matters. 
Part I of this Article examines executive compensation trends before and 
after the financial crisis and explains how most commentators have concluded that 
compensation is excessive.
29
 Part I ends by revealing that most commentators 
agree that the best way to address excessive executive compensation is to enhance 
accountability. Part II discusses the rise of say on pay as an ideal accountability 
measure, as well as the debate regarding the merits of say on pay. Part III reveals 
why most commentators believe fiduciary duty law is neither necessary nor 
appropriate as an accountability tool. Part III also explores the potential viability of 
the shareholder derivative actions brought in the wake of say on pay votes in the 
context of current Delaware law.
30
 Moreover, Part III reveals how most courts 
have chosen to dismiss say on pay suits. Part IV demonstrates why the efforts to 
dismiss the importance of fiduciary duty law as an accountability check for 
compensation decisions may be premature and makes the affirmative case not only 
for altering the manner in which Delaware courts assess such suits, but also for 
using say on pay suits as a platform for such alteration. 
I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Executive Compensation Trends 
Studies confirm that executive pay at large U.S. companies has sharply 
risen over the past few decades. Most studies define executive pay to include base 
salaries and bonuses or incentive-based compensation, including cash, stock, stock 
                                                                                                                
  28. See infra Part IV.B.5. 
  29. Despite some debate on the topic, this Article accepts the premise that 
executive compensation is excessive at some corporations and needs to be curtailed. Even 
defenders of executive pay acknowledge that some practices can be problematic. See, e.g., 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 
1661–62 (2005). This Article also acknowledges the difficulties of determining when 
compensation should be deemed excessive, which is why this Article focuses on reforms 
that rely on the corporation’s own metrics and policies as a guide for such a determination. 
  30. Part III and this Article as a whole focus on Delaware due to its 
acknowledged prominence in corporate law. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004). According to the Delaware Division of Corporations, 
Delaware is the incorporation home to more than 50% of U.S. public companies and 63% of 
Fortune 500 companies. Delaware Division of Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV, 
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
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options, or other arrangements.
31
 One study revealed that the average annual CEO 
pay at S&P 500 companies increased from $850,000 in 1970 to more than $14 
million in 2000—an increase driven largely by the practice of awarding stock 
options and restricted stock.
32
 During the 1980s, CEO compensation grew by 
212%,
33
 and from 1980 to 1995, average CEO pay increased by 380%.
34
 From 
1993 to 2003, median CEO compensation at S&P 500 firms increased 146%.
35
 
During that same period, the median pay of the five most highly compensated 
executives at S&P 500 companies increased by 125%.
36
 Median CEO pay 
increased by 25% in 2004,
37
 and another 25% in 2005.
38
 These studies confirm that 
executive compensation in general, and CEO compensation in particular, has 
grown considerably in the past few decades. 
CEO compensation dipped during the financial crisis but appears to have 
rebounded.
39
 In 2007, median CEO pay at S&P 500 companies was about $9 
million.
40
 In 2008, median pay fell for the first time since 2002, dropping 6.8% to 
approximately $8.4 million.
41
 Such a drop stemmed from the fact that in 2008 
median bonuses and incentive cash payments fell 27%, though base salaries rose 
by 3%.
42
 Median CEO pay fell again in 2009 by 7.9% to $7.5 million.
43
 In 2010, 
                                                                                                                
  31. See Barris, supra note 18, at 63–64; Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The 
Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 284 (2005); Hansen & 
Strauss, supra note 15. 
  32. Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 24–25; see also Barris, supra note 18, at 64 
(revealing that stock options represent the fastest growing component of compensation 
packages). Studies also suggest that executive compensation increased due to an increased 
frequency of filling CEO vacancies externally, as opposed to locating new CEOs inside the 
firm. See Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 32–34. 
  33. Barris, supra note 18, at 60. 
  34. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 6 (2000). 
  35. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 31, at 285. 
  36. Id. 
  37. Hansen & Strauss, supra note 15. 
  38. Id. 
  39.  See generally Mira Ganor, Agency Costs in the Era of Economic Crisis: The 
Enhanced Connection Between CEO Compensation and Corporate Cash Holdings, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 105 (2013). 
  40. Press Release, Equilar, Inc., CEO Pay Drops 4.0% to $2.7 Million. Bonuses 
Fall 22.6% (Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter CEO Pay Drops], available at http://www.equilar.
com/company/press-release/press-release-2009/ceo-pay-falls-6.8-in-first-drop-since-2002-
bonuses-cut-by-20.6.html (noting that median CEO salaries in 2007 were $9,061,057). 
  41. Id. 
  42. See Del Jones & Barbara Hansen, CEO Pay Packages Sink with the 
Economy, USA TODAY, May 4, 2009, at 1B; see also CEO Pay Drops, supra note 40 
(noting a 20.6% drop in median bonuses and a 5.7% rise in median base salary at S&P firms 
from 2007 to 2008). The SEC requires corporations to value stocks options as if they were 
exercised on the grant date, which could inflate or deflate CEO’s compensation. See Jones 
& Hansen, supra. In 2008, it was estimated that 90% of CEO options were under water, 
meaning that their “current stock price [was] too low to yield a profit.” Id. Hence, the actual 
value of CEO compensation, incorporating such options, was considerably lower. Of 
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CEO compensation returned to its 2007 levels with median CEO pay totaling 
about $9 million, a 27% jump from 2009.
44
 
In addition to the tremendous growth in CEO compensation, the gap 
between CEO wages and those of the average worker
45
 has grown considerably 
over the decades. In 1960, the average CEO made 40 times as much as the average 
worker.
46
 In 1991, CEOs received 140 times the average worker’s pay.
47
 In 2001, 
this ratio peaked at 525 to 1.
48
 In 2003, the ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay 
fell to 301 to 1 and then rose to 431 to 1 in 2004.
49
 Currently, empirical data 
reflects a ratio of anywhere from 400 to 1 to about 300 to 1.
50
 
                                                                                                                
course, restricted stock and options were issued in 2009 at low strike prices. See id. 
Therefore, such grants may be considerably more valuable once stock prices rise. See id. 
Moreover, many companies either reprice or reissue options if they become valueless. See 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 165; Davis, supra note 5, at 431–32. 
  43. Press Release, Equilar, Inc., Bucking Trend, S&P 400 CEO Compensation 
Rises in Equilar Pay Study (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.equilar.com/company/
press-release/press-release-2010/overall-ceo-compensation-falls-bonuses-surge-in-sp-500-
pay-study.html. 
  44. Matt Krantz & Barbara Hansen, CEO Pay Soars While Workers’ Pay Stalls, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2011, at 1B. But see Daniel Costello, The Drought is Over (at Least 
for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at BU1 (noting that median CEO pay rose to $9.6 
million, a 12% jump from 2009). In 2010, the highest paid CEO made about $84 million. 
See id.; Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2011, at B1. 
  45.  For an example of one editorial that seeks to describe “average worker,” see 
Charles Kolb, The Value(s) of Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2010, 2:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-kolb/the-values-of-wall-street_b_652697.html.  
  46. Ron Ashkenas, Rethinking the Assumptions Behind Executive Pay, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (June 22, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/ashkenas/2010/06/rethinking-
the-assumptions-beh.html. 
  47. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 130–31. 
  48. Jeanne Sahadi, CEO Pay: Sky High Gets Even Higher, CNNMONEY (Aug. 
30, 2005, 12:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/26/news/economy/ceo_pay/. 
  49. Id. 
  50. See Delman, supra note 6, at 598–99 (noting that the ratio of CEO pay to the 
average worker’s pay was more than 300 to 1 in 2008); Michael B. Dorff, The Group 
Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2007) 
(noting that the ratio of a CEO’s pay to the average worker’s pay went from approximately 
40 to 1 to more than 400 to 1 by 2007); Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 6 (noting that from 
1980 to 1995, average CEO pay increased 380% even though workers’ salaries only 
increased by 60%); Jennifer Hicks, Does CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio Matter?, SMARTBLOG 
ON LEADERSHIP (June 1, 2011), http://smartblogs.com/leadership/2011/06/01/does-ceo-to-
worker-pay-ratio-matter/ (noting that CEOs made 336 times the pay of an average worker in 
2010); Albert R. Hunt, Letter from Washington: As U.S. Rich-Poor Gap Grows, So Does 
Public Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/world/
americas/18iht-letter.4637416.html?pagewanted=all (noting that CEO pay is 400 times that 
of the average worker’s pay). 
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B. Executive Compensation as Excess 
Public opinion surveys consistently report that the vast majority of 
Americans believe executives at publicly held corporations are overpaid.
51
 At least 
one survey reveals that about 90% of institutional investors view executives’ pay 
as excessive.
52
 Those who characterize executive compensation as excessive 
generally do so for one of the three reasons discussed below. 
1. The Pay-for-Performance Disconnect 
The most prevalent reason why shareholders and the public view 
executive compensation as excessive is that they believe that such compensation is 
not sufficiently linked to corporate performance. Hence, such groups express 
outrage when executives receive large pay packages while their companies’ stock 
price or annual shareholder return is flat or deteriorating.
53
 
Whatever the causes, the pay-for-performance disconnect appears to be 
the primary driver of discontent over executive compensation. In the context of say 
on pay, recent data reveals that proxy advisory firms
54
—which are entities that 
issue recommendations regarding how shareholders should vote—are most likely 
to recommend rejecting corporations’ pay practices when there is a perceived pay-
for-performance disconnect.
55
 Similarly, the primary reason shareholders give for 
                                                                                                                
  51. See, e.g., Press Release, Humphrey Taylor, Chairman, Harris Interactive, 
Polls Find Strong Populist Mood in Europe and to a Lesser Extent in the USA 3 tbl.4 (July 
25, 2007), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-
Research-FT-Globalization-2007-07.pdf (revealing that 77% of Americans believe that 
executives are over paid); RBJ Snap Poll: CEOs of Public Companies Are Overpaid, 
ROCHESTER BUS. J. (May 27, 2011), http://www.rbj.net/print_article.asp?aID=187715 
(noting that 86% respondents to an RBJ Daily Report Snap Poll said CEOs of U.S. 
companies are given too much money). 
  52. Press Release, Towers Watson, Institutional Investors Dissatisfied with U.S. 
Executive Pay System, Watson Wyatt Study Finds (Dec. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/render.asp?catid=1&id=15518. 
  53. See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 5, at 7, 9 (noting that public anger over 
executive compensation relates to the overall increase in pay but also to pay arrangements 
that appear unrelated to performance). In their seminal book, Pay Without Performance, 
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried illustrate the widespread pay-for-performance disconnect 
at public companies and advance theories for its root causes, as well as potential solutions. 
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18. 
  54. See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 60–61 (2011). 
  55. See COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, SAY-ON-PAY UPDATE: VOTING RESULTS AND 
TRENDS SO FAR 4–5 (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.cogentcompensation.com/
images/resources/SayOnPayUpdate_June2011.pdf; MICHAEL R. LITTENBERG ET AL., 
SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, THE VOTES ARE IN—DECONSTRUCTING THE 2011 SAY ON PAY 
VOTE 2 (2011), available at http://www.srz.com/files/News/dbf0ba31-2627-402c-b211-
3a6cc3e83295/Presentation/NewsAttachment/643250b0-a583-444c-9011-05277889fc1e/06
2811_The_Votes_Are_In_Deconstructing_the_2011_Say_on_Pay_Vote.pdf (revealing that 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) pinpointed a pay-for-performance disconnect at 
31 of the 36 companies whose pay packages were rejected by shareholders). 
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rejecting a company’s pay package relates to pay-for-performance issues.
56
 For 
example, shareholders rejected the pay arrangements at a company in which the 
CEO received a $6.7 million increase in pay while the company’s one-year 
shareholder return was negative 10.3% and its three-year return was negative 
30.6%.
57
 Then too, in each of the lawsuits filed after a negative say on pay vote, 




During the financial crisis, the disconnect between pay and performance 
drove compensation issues into the spotlight. For instance, public anger 
skyrocketed upon learning of the decision by American International Group 
(“AIG”) to pay its executives bonuses totaling $165 million on the heels of 
receiving more than $170 billion in bailout funds from the federal government.
59
 
Such outrage prompted Congress to pass laws prohibiting companies, which 
receive financial assistance, from awarding incentive pay, applying a 90% tax to 
AIG and other firms that accepted large sums of federal bailout funds,
60
 and 
ultimately imposing laws prohibiting TARP companies from paying bonuses.
61
 
Similar outrage followed news that the head of Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc. 
(“Lehman Brothers”), made some $480 million in the years preceding the bank’s 
historic collapse in 2008.
62
 The public’s fury was ignited again upon learning that 
Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”), paid $3.6 billion in bonuses 
after losing about $27 billion and receiving $10 billion in TARP funding.
63
 Indeed, 
the New York Attorney General issued a report revealing that nine banks issued 
$32.6 billion in bonuses in 2008 while receiving $175 billion of funding from the 
                                                                                                                
  56. TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON 
REPORT 5 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/private/
2011_US_PostSeason_Report_0929.pdf. 
  57. Id. at 7. 
  58. See William Alan Nelson II, Ending the Silence: Shareholder Derivative 
Suits and Amending the Dodd–Frank Act so “Say on Pay” Votes May be Heard in the 
Boardroom, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 149, 172–74 (2012); infra Part II.C (discussing 
suits). 
  59. See Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses 
After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1; see also Helene Cooper, 
Obama Orders Treasury Chief to Try to Block A.I.G. Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/politics/17obama.html?fta=y; Jonathan Weisman et 
al., Political Heat Sears AIG, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A1. 
  60. See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Approves 90% Tax on 
Bonuses After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1.  
  61. See 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (2012)) (requiring TARP companies to 
prohibit the payment of bonuses). 
  62. Jim Puzzanghera, Lehman Chief Grilled on Pay, Leadership of Company, 
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/10/07/
lehman_chief_grilled_on_pay_leadership_of_company/. 
  63. See ANDREW CUOMO, NO RHYME OR REASON: THE ‘HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU 
LOSE’ BANKS BONUS CULTURE 10 (July 30, 2009), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/press-releases/archived/Bonus%20Report%20Final%207.30.09.pdf; Michael J. 
de la Merced & Louise Story, Nearly 700 at Merrill in Million-Dollar Club, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2009, at B1. 
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government.
64




2. Parachutes as Good as Gold 
The second concern regarding executive compensation relates to 
executives who receive exit packages after overseeing a corporation whose 
performance has declined.
66
 These exit packages, known as “golden parachutes,” 
mushroomed during the takeover movements in the 1980s.
67
 During that period, 
executives began contracting for exit packages that would compensate them in the 
event of being fired after a takeover or some other change of control.
68
 Golden 
parachutes can be viewed as an anti-takeover device because their existence made 
it more costly to terminate incumbent executives, thereby either increasing the cost 
of a potential takeover or ensuring that executives would remain in the office post-
takeover.
69




                                                                                                                
  64. See CUOMO supra note 63, at 5–6. 
  65. See Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During 
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1; Karen Freifeld, Banks Paid $32.6 Billion in 
Bonuses Amid U.S. Bailout (Update4), BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2009, 5:38 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHURVoSUqpho. 
  66. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract 
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 368, 374 (2009); Josh Fineman, Nardelli Exit Package Called ‘Outrage,” May 
Heighten Pay Debate, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2007, 4:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aI7fAyAMAi2A. Shareholders also have expressed 
concern about so-called “golden coffins”—benefits paid upon the death of an executive that 
significantly exceed life insurance or other payments typically made to employees. See THE 
CONFERENCE BD., supra note 5, at 22. In 2009, there was significant shareholder support for 
shareholder proposals seeking to curb golden coffin benefits. Subodh Mishra, Governance 
Proposals: Support for Reform Grows, in RISKMETRICS GROUP POSTSEASON REPORT 2009: 
A NEW VOICE IN GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL POLICYMAKERS SHAPE THE ROAD TO REFORM 13, 
13–14 (Oct. 2009), available at https://www.governanceexchange.com/repository/
KnowledgeGateway/pubs/2009_PSR_Client_final.PDF. 
  67. Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 955, 955–58 (1987). 
  68. See id. at 955–60; see also Cherry & Wong, supra note 66, at 374. 
  69. See Robert A. Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can 
Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 
341 (1983); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1218 n.63 
(1984). But see Bress, supra note 67, at 955–62 (noting that golden parachutes may be 
beneficial to companies prone to engage in takeover activity because they may reduce the 
risks associated with takeovers and help align executives’ incentives with those of 
shareholders). 
  70. Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 28–29. In 2000, 70% of the largest 1,000 
companies had change-in-control agreements, as opposed to 41% in 1988. Id. at 29. Such 
agreements typically incorporate golden parachutes. See Hansen & Strauss, supra note 15 
(noting that golden parachute payments have become “boilerplate”). 
2013] SUE ON PAY 13 
One of the most notable cases involved the CEO of The Walt Disney 
Company (“Disney”), who received a $140 million severance package after 
working at the company just over 14 months.
71
 The pay package ignited 
shareholder outrage, spurring several lawsuits, as well as several shareholder 
campaigns aimed at gaining more influence over directors and their pay 
decisions.
72
 Golden parachute arrangements also have drawn shareholders’ ire 
during the financial crisis. Shareholders fumed when Home Depot’s CEO received 
a $210 million severance package after overseeing a company whose stock price 
had fallen by 12% during his five-year tenure while the stock price at the 
company’s biggest competitor had increased by 173%.
73
 Shareholders also 
expressed outrage when Merrill Lynch’s CEO received some $161 million as exit 
pay a week after the company reported a $7.9 billion write-down from subprime 
mortgage losses—the largest loss in the corporation’s history.
74
 Similarly, the CEO 
of Citigroup, Inc. (“Citigroup”), received about $68 million upon his departure, 
including a car and driver “for the lesser of five years or until he commences full 
time employment with another employer” after presiding over a company whose 
losses resulted in $7.2 billion dollars of write-downs.
75
 Similar to executive 
compensation, shareholders express concern about golden parachutes primarily 
when there appears to be no link between them and corporate performance.
76
 
3. Pay Inequity 
Some shareholders insist that executive pay should be more closely 
aligned with the pay of average workers. Additionally, some investors share the 
                                                                                                                
  71. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
  72. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d at 
353. Shareholder outrage led to a “withhold the vote” campaign against Disney’s CEO and 
board chair, resulting in 45% of the shareholder votes being withheld—at the time, one of 
the largest withholdings in history. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for 
Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 62 (2008). 
  73. Fineman, supra note 66; Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 27, 2006, at C1. 
  74. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Merrill CEO Steps Down, Leaves Firm in Crisis, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2007, at D01. Interestingly, the board did not give the CEO severance 
pay. Id. Instead, his exit package primarily included unexercised stock options and stock 
awards. Id. The lack of severance pay prompted some to mute their criticism of the pay 
package. Id. 
  75. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114, 138 
(Del. Ch. 2009). Such pay led to a shareholder lawsuit. Id. Shareholders also brought suit 
alleging that that directors should be held liable for failing to monitor the risk the company 
faced resulting from investment in subprime mortgages, as well as for failing to properly 
disclose the company’s exposure to such risk. Id. at 126, 131–32. 
  76. See Del Jones & Edward Iwata, Top Executives’ Pay Takes a Hit, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 29, 2008, at 4B (discussing exit pay by some firms during the crisis and 
noting that golden parachutes have long been a “sore point” with investors). In the U.K., 
shareholders view generous golden parachutes as particularly egregious because they are 
deemed to be “rewards for failure.” See Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes 
and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 527 (2013). 
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sentiment that CEO pay should be no more than 100 times that of the average 
worker.
77
 From this perspective, the increasing gap between executive pay and that 
of the average worker makes executive compensation excessive.
78
 During the 
crisis, this gap was amplified when CEO salaries increased while the 
unemployment rate steadily rose and average worker pay increased only slightly.
79
 
C. Debating the Excess 
There are some commentators who insist that most executive pay should 
not be characterized as excessive.
80
 First, even though headlines are replete with 
stories about executives receiving lavish pay packages despite their companies’ 
lackluster performance, these headlines may distort the actual compensation 
picture. For example, some CEOs agreed to forego salaries and bonuses during the 
height of the crisis.
81
 Also, some studies indicate that CEO pay fell as profits fell 
during the crisis and that CEO pay has recently recovered as profits and stock 
prices have begun their recovery.
82
 This suggests that executive pay, in some 
cases, is in sync with corporate performance. 
Second, it is arguable that so long as the market dictates pay practices, it 
is inappropriate to characterize compensation as excessive.
83
 The board’s primary 
responsibility is to hire a top-performing CEO.
84
 Because executives are in short 
                                                                                                                
  77. Hicks, supra note 50, at 2 (discussing a survey where approximately 51% of 
respondents indicated that CEO salaries should be no more than 100 times that of the 
average worker). 
  78. See Delman, supra note 6, at 599 (noting that some shareholders and 
Americans view this disparity as a social injustice). 
  79. See Costello, supra note 44; Krantz & Hansen, supra note 44 (noting that 
CEO pay increased 27% in 2010 while average worker pay only increased by 2.1%). 
  80. Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 3–4. 
  81. Jones & Hansen, supra note 42. Seventy-nine CEOs received no bonuses and 
six CEOs either took no salary or a $1 salary in 2008. Id. 
  82. See Kantz & Hansen, supra note 44; EQUILAR, INC., 2009 PROXY SEASON 
TRENDS 6–7 (Apr. 23, 2009) (demonstrating that CEO pay decreased at poorly performing 
firms and that bonus payments fell by 65.2% at the worst performing firms), available at 
http://www.naspp.com/ChapterEventFiles/e2902_Equilar_Proxy_Season_Trends_for_MN_
NASPP_on_04_23_2009.pdf. 
  83. See Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other?: Testing the 
Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 255, 267 (2005) (noting the theory that when executive compensation is set by an 
efficient market, it is difficult to describe such compensation as excessive); Loewenstein, 
supra note 34, at 2 (pointing out the theory that free market controls compensation and thus 
executives cannot be considered overpaid); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate 
Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975–78 (1980) (noting that market forces dictate executive 
compensation). 
  84. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S 
GUIDEBOOK § 4 (6th ed. 2011) (noting that a director’s principal responsibility is to hire top 
management, which includes establishing and evaluating their compensation); Simmons, 
supra note 1, at 310; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2010, at 7 
(Apr. 2010), available at http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads
/2010_Principles_of_Corporate_Governance_1.pdf (“Making decisions regarding the 
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supply, and demand for executives is high, companies must expend significant 
resources to hire and retain them.
85
 Moreover, the difference in pay reflects 
differences in levels of contribution because executives not only may contribute 
more than other workers, but also, may have a greater impact on corporate 
performance.
86
 This is why it may be inappropriate to measure executive 
compensation against that of average worker pay or to otherwise use the ratio to 
characterize executive pay as too lavish. 
Third, although many agree that pay must be aligned with performance, it 
is not clear how best to achieve such a result.
87
 Indeed, outrage over executive 
compensation may reflect an inadequate understanding of executive compensation 
policies and practices. On the one hand, corporations rely on a variety of different 
metrics to set pay.
88
 Hence, it may be unfair to critique executive pay based on 
only one metric—its relationship with overall corporate performance. On the other 
hand, compensation experts cannot necessarily predict the impact of pay practices. 
Some practices produce unintended consequences. As one scholar points out, there 
used to be “little doubt” among the most influential corporate-law scholars that 
emphasizing stock-based pay would align managers’ incentives with shareholders’ 
interests.
89
 Yet this presumption has been proven false. Such pay not only has 
spurred rises in compensation packages, but has also created misalignment 
between executive pay and performance.
90
 In light of the complexity associated 
with executive compensation decisions, defenders of the current system argue that 
                                                                                                                
selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical CEO is the single 
most important function of the board.”). 
  85. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 31, at 298; see Jensen et al., supra note 1, 
at 32–34 (noting that CEO compensation increased when corporations began hiring CEOs 
from outside of their company instead of from within their internal candidate pool). 
  86. See Pak, supra note 4, at 638–39 (pinpointing the argument that the 
difference between executive and worker pay reflects executives’ greater contribution to 
corporate success). 
  87. See Dorff, supra note 83, at 267 (noting that the question of what constitutes 
excessive compensation is “almost impossible to answer”); Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 
206–07 (pinpointing a complex set of questions that must be addressed when seeking to set 
executive compensation at an appropriate level); Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 5 (noting 
that the supply and demand for workers may have reduced their bargaining power to 
demand higher wages); Pak, supra note 4, at 641 (“[C]orrelating pay to performance may be 
a herculean task which defies easy comprehension and quick solutions.”). 
  88. Simmons, supra note 1, at 310–12. 
  89. Cunningham, supra note 18, at 1190. 
  90. See id. at 1195–97. Professor Cunningham points out that when corporations 
compensate boards with stock-based pay, managers’ incentives may become misaligned 
with shareholders in at least three ways: (1) managers become fixated on current stock price 
in a manner that undermines a focus on long-term value; (2) such fixation causes managers 
to be tempted to distort financial records and financial performance; and (3) managers 
prefer stock repurchases to cash dividends, even when such repurchases are less beneficial 
to most shareholders. Id. at 1195–96. In short, a focus on stock-based compensation for 
boards has the unintended consequence of causing boards to focus on issues at odds with 
shareholders in an effort to buttress stock performance, and thus, boards’ overall 
compensation. 
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so long as boards make reasonable efforts to align profits with performance, the 
ultimate pay award should not be viewed as excessive. 
Critics nevertheless insist that the current executive-compensation system 
is flawed. In particular, several commentators have advanced a managerial-power 
theory demonstrating and undermining the view that pay arrangements result from 
an arms-length, market-based bargaining system.
91
 Instead, the theory indicates 
that too often compensation reflects dominance by the CEO or other influences 
that distort pay arrangements.
92
 In other words, boards are captured by 
management and make decisions that benefit executives at shareholders’ 
expense.
93
 At least some evidence supports this board-capture theory, revealing a 
significant divide between pay and performance.
94
 Thus, anecdotal evidence and 
studies demonstrate that during the financial crisis executive pay remained the 
same at many companies even as their profits or revenues fell.
95
 Other studies 
show that bonuses and overall compensation at some firms did not vary 
significantly even as profits diminished.
96
 But others indicate that pay and bonuses 




Ultimately, as Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann note, after the 
financial crisis, the notion that that our current pay system is problematic mostly 
because of a pay-for-performance disconnect has become “widely accepted.”
98
 As 
this next Section pinpoints, there is also general agreement that accountability may 
be the cure to this misalignment. 
D. Accountability as Cure for the Excess 
Directors have a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that CEO and 
executive pay is set at an appropriate level. Some even consider decisions related 
to the selection and compensation of the CEO and senior executives to be the 
                                                                                                                
  91. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 64–66; Andrew Bethune, An 
Efficient “Say” on Executive Pay: Shareholder Opt-In As a Solution to the Managerial 
Power Problem, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 585, 595–98 (2011); Dorff, supra note 83, at 267–68; 
Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 866–
67 (2008). 
  92. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 61–62. 
  93. See id.  
  94. See Barris, supra note 18, at 65; Dorff, supra note 83, at 268–69. 
  95. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257–62 
(2010); Janice McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal 
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive 
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131, 138–39 (2009); see also Story & Dash, supra note 
65. 
  96. See CUOMO, supra note 63, at 1. 
  97. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 82, at 6. 
  98. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 
GEO. L.J. 247, 249–50 (2010) (noting that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the view 
that there are flaws in the compensation arrangements has become “widely accepted”). 
2013] SUE ON PAY 17 
board’s primary function.
99
 Public company boards delegate this function to the 
compensation committee, though all directors are ultimately responsible for 
executive pay decisions. 
In light of this responsibility, if executive compensation is excessive, then 
boards have failed in their fiduciary obligations. Hence, executive pay critics 
consistently assert that boards have done an inadequate job not only with respect to 
devising compensation packages, but also in relation to developing appropriate 
executive pay policies and practices.
100
 
The most dominant rationale for this inadequacy is the board-capture 
theory. Pursuant to this theory, managers have considerable influence over boards 
in part because managers play a significant role in the director nomination 
process.
101
 Because boards feel beholden to CEOs and other senior executives, 
they fail to provide any meaningful check on executive compensation packages.
102
 
Instead, executives dictate the terms of those packages.
103
 Moreover, directors are 
too often at an informational disadvantage when assessing and approving 
compensation packages.
104
 As a result, they defer to executives or other 
corporation managers who may have more expertise and experience.
105
 The board-
capture theory posits that executive pay arrangements are not the result of an arms-
length bargaining process but instead tend to benefit executives at the expense of 
the corporation and its shareholders. 
The antidote to board capture is to enhance board accountability, ensuring 
that boards are properly incentivized to focus on the interest of the corporation and 
its shareholders when crafting pay policies.
106
 As the SEC noted, the financial 
                                                                                                                
  99. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 84 (“Making decisions regarding the 
selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical CEO is the single 
most important function of the board.”); AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, 
supra note 84 (noting that a director’s principal responsibility is to hire top management, 
which includes establishing and evaluating their compensation). 
100. See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 5, at 9; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 
18, at 61. 
101. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 
852–53. 
102. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 
852–53. 
103. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; Thomas & Wells, supra note 
18, at 852–53. 
104. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 851. 
105. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; see also Thomas & Wells, supra 
note 18, at 852–54. 
106. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview 
of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 672–73 (2005); CEO Compensation in the Post-Enron 
Era: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., S. Hrg. 108-893, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Associate General Counsel of the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) (“[W]e believe that solutions 
to the problem of executive pay require at minimum good disclosure to investors and the 
public and real accountability of boards . . . .”), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-108shrg97981/html/CHRG-108shrg97981.htm. 
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crisis caused many to question whether boards of directors are truly held 
responsible for the decisions that they make, including “whether boards need to be 
more accountable for their decisions regarding such issues as compensation 
structures . . . .”
107
 
Reforms therefore seek to enhance board accountability by reducing 
boards’ dependency on managers and increasing the extent to which they feel 
compelled to pay heed to the concerns of shareholders, concerns of the public, and 
the interests of the corporation more generally.
108
 In its report on responses to the 
financial crisis, one group of governance experts emphasized that “[g]reater board 
accountability to shareholders is essential to improve executive compensation 
practices.”
109
 Indeed, reformers believe that increased disclosure surrounding 
executive compensation will make directors more accountable for those decisions 
by increasing shareholder and public awareness of the nature of their decisions and 
potential problems related thereto.
110
 The compensation reforms under Dodd–
Frank also seek to enhance board accountability. Reflecting this aim, the 




Although fiduciary duty law is the primary accountability mechanism 
under state law, most reforms ignore or actively shun such law. Instead, reforms 
have focused on other measures, including, most recently, say on pay. Part II 
discusses say on pay and its potential to enhance accountability, while Part III 
reveals why fiduciary law has been shunned in favor of say on pay. 
II. SAY ON PAY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Say on Pay Has Its Day 
During the financial crisis, many different reforms emerged to enhance 
board accountability related to executive compensation. Those reforms ranged 
from outright restrictions on pay packages to enhanced disclosure related to 
                                                                                                                
107. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC 
Chairman: Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch0520
09mls.htm. 
108. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 335–37 (noting perception that most believe 
executive compensation reform should focus on subjecting compensation decisions to 
greater accountability). 
109. SEE IRA MILLSTEIN ET AL., MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
PERFORMANCE, AGENDA FOR PRIVATE SECTOR REFORM: OMNIBUS POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A POST-CRISIS MARKET 14 (2009), available at http://millstein.som.
yale.edu/sites/millstein.som.yale.edu/files/Policy%20Briefing%20No%206-Omnibus.pdf. 
110. Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
9, 2006, at BU1 (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as saying, “when people 
are forced to undress in public, they’ll pay more attention to their figures”). 
 111. Dodd–Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, subtit. E, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–
1908 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2012) and scattered sections under title 15 of the 
U.S. Code). 
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executive compensation.
112
 The federal government even appointed a so-called pay 




Amidst these reforms, say on pay has garnered considerable attention and 
support. As one commentator noted, say on pay emerged from “a novel idea at the 
margins of the executive pay debate to center stage as the leading hope for 
ensuring that shareholders have a voice in the compensation-setting process.”
114
 
Increasingly, shareholders have expressed support for say on pay.
115
 In response, 
                                                                                                                
112. See Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & the 
Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 529–51 (2010) (describing and critiquing various reforms). 
Reforms aimed at curbing executive compensation run the gamut. Some reforms, called 
clawbacks, require executives to return bonuses or other incentive-based compensation if it 
is later determined that the corporation must restate its earnings or if bonuses or similar 
compensation were awarded during a period in which it is determined that the corporation 
has engaged in fraud. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 347. Other reforms also have focused 
on ways to limit executive compensation. For example, TARP guidelines have restricted 
compensation for performance to one-third of an executive’s securities compensation 
package. See Executive Compensation: Plan, Preform & Pay, DELOITTE, http://www.
deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/additional-services/chief-financial-officer/6297c38dfe
289210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm (last updated July 14, 2010). The Obama 
administration also cut executive salaries of certain companies receiving government 
bailouts by about 50%. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Will Order Pay Cuts at Firms with 
Bailout Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A1. Dodd–Frank has various executive 
compensation disclosure requirements including a provision requiring companies to disclose 
the median annual total compensation of all their employees, excluding the CEO; the annual 
total compensation of the CEO; and the ratio between the two. Dodd–Frank § 953(b). In 
June 2011, the House Financial Services Committee passed an act seeking to repeal Section 
953(b) and to make any regulations issued pursuant to it have no force or effect. Cydney 
Posner, Bill to Repeal Required Dodd–Frank Disclosure Regarding Internal Pay Equity, 
COOLEY, LLP (June 24, 2011), http://www.cooley.com/65216. Disclosure on executive 
compensation dates back to at least 1992 when the SEC responded to concerns regarding 
heightened executive pay by passing disclosure rules requiring companies to disclose the 
compensation of top executives in the proxy statement. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 342–
43. 
113. Deborah Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J., 
June 5, 2009, at A2. The administration appointed Kenneth Feinberg to be the special 
master for compensation. Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives’ Pay at 7 Ailing 
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A1. 
114. COMPENSIA, INC., supra note 8, at 6. 
115. Say on pay initially emerged through the shareholder proposal process, 
pursuant to which shareholders submit proposals on the corporation’s proxy statement to be 
voted on by other shareholders. The first say on pay proposals appeared in 2006. See 
Reeder, supra note 10, at 139; Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: 
International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 1, 11 (2008); Allan Sloan, Aflac Looks Smart on Pay, WASH. POST, May 29, 
2007, at D01 (noting that such proposals were sponsored by the American Federation of 
State, County & Municipal Employees). In 2007, shareholders submitted over 60 say on pay 
proposals, averaging 40% shareholder support. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 
12. By 2009, shareholders submitted more than 100 such proposals, making it the most 
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some corporations voluntarily adopted it.
116
 Although there was some support for 
say on pay at the federal level,
117
 that support increased dramatically during the 
financial crisis. Thus, in 2009, federal legislation required companies receiving 
TARP funds to hold an annual say on pay vote until the funds were repaid.
118
 As a 
result, more than 300 companies were required to hold say on pay votes.
119
 
In 2010, Dodd–Frank made say on pay a permanent feature of the 
corporate governance landscape.
120
 Under Dodd–Frank, public companies must 
provide an advisory vote on the compensation of the five most highly compensated 
executives.
121
 This includes the CEO, CFO, and the next three most highly 
compensated executives. Companies must provide a say on pay vote at least once 
every three years.
122
 However, Dodd–Frank gives shareholders a voice in 
determining the frequency of the say on pay vote. Thus, companies must conduct a 
                                                                                                                
dominant shareholder proposal of the year. See Reeder, supra note 10, at 2; see also 
RiskMetrics Grp., 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard, RISKMETRICS GRP. (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/sop/Library/20091215_RiskMetrics-Scorecard.pdf 
(reflecting that say on pay was the most prevalent shareholder proposal submitted in 2009). 
In 2009, the average shareholder support for shareholder-sponsored say on pay proposals 
had risen to about 41%, with almost three times as many proposals receiving majority 
support as compared to 2008. See Randall Thomas et al., Dodd–Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It 
Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
1213, 1242 (2012). 
116. In response to a 2006 shareholder proposal, Aflac was the first company to 
make such an announcement, and in 2008, Aflac became the first company to hold a say on 
pay vote. See Sloan, supra note 115; see also Press Release, Aflac, Aflac Moves Up ‘Say-
on-Pay’ Shareholder Vote to 2008, available at http://www.aflac.com/aboutaflac/
pressroom/pressreleasestory.aspx?rid=1078006 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013); Press Release, 
Cheryl Kelly, AFSCME, More than 50 Companies Voluntarily Adopt “Say on Pay” as 
Institutional Investors Continue to Press for an Advisory Vote (Mar. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.waldenassetmgmt.com/social/action/SOP_3-2-10.pdf. By early 2010, more than 
50 companies had announced an intention to provide say on pay, including Apple, 
Blockbuster, and Motorola. See id. 
117. In 2007, the House passed a say on pay bill. See Shareholder Vote on 
Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1257rfs/pdf/BILLS-110hr1257rfs.pdf. Then-
Senator Barack Obama sponsored the companion say on pay bill in the Senate, but it failed 
to muster the necessary votes. See Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 
1181, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s1181. In 
2009, members of both the House and Senate proposed say on pay provisions in bills aimed 
at responding to the financial crisis. See Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R. 
2861, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=h111-2861; Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/legislation/bill-text-
shareholders-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009.pdf. 
118. See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012). 
119. See Reeder, supra note 10; Weaver et al., supra note 10, at 24. 
120. Dodd–Frank Act § 951. 
121. Id. § 951(a)(1). 
122. Id. 
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nonbinding “say on frequency” vote at least once every six years.
123
 Pursuant to 
the vote, shareholders can recommend whether to have a say on pay vote annually, 
every two years, or every three years.
124
 These say on pay rules took effect on 




In certain circumstances, Dodd–Frank also requires companies to hold a 
say on pay vote for golden parachute arrangements in connection with mergers, 
acquisitions, consolidations, or sale of all, or substantially all, of the company’s 
assets.
126
 When shareholder approval is required for such transactions, companies 
must also seek a separate say on pay vote related to golden parachute arrangements 
between the target company and executives, unless the golden parachute 
arrangements were included in disclosures comprising a company’s prior say on 
pay vote.
127
 These golden parachute provisions took effect for proxy statements 
filed on or after April 25, 2011.
128
 These say on pay votes on overall compensation 
and golden parachutes respond to two of the primary shareholder concerns 
animating the executive pay debate. 
B. Say on Pay as Accountability Cure 
Although there is considerable debate about the merits of say on pay, 
advocates support say on pay as a critical mechanism for enhancing director 
accountability.
129
 Based primarily on the U.K. experience, advocates insist that say 
on pay enhances such accountability and thus better aligns executive pay with 
corporate performance.
130
 The most comprehensive study of the impact of say on 
pay in the U.K. reveals that say on pay has more closely linked pay and 
performance, particularly at poorly performing firms.
131
 Supporters point to this 
data as evidence of the positive impact say on pay can have on American 
                                                                                                                
123. Id. § 951(a)(2). 
124. Id. 
125. Dodd–Frank characterizes small companies, and thus companies with 
delayed implementation of the say on pay rules, as companies with a public float of less 
than $75 million. See Christopher G. Barrett & William K. Hadler, Final Say-on-Pay Rules 
Delay Requirements for Smaller Reporting Companies and TARP Recipients, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/final-say-pay-rules-
delay-requirements-smaller-reporting-companies-and-tarp-participants. 
126. Dodd–Frank Act § 951(b). 
127. Id. § 951(b)(2). 
128. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say on 
Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd–Frank Act (Jan. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm. 
129. See Nelson, supra note 58, at 154. 
130. See STEPHEN DAVIS, YALE MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
PERFORMANCE, DOES ‘SAY ON PAY’ WORK?: LESSONS ON MAKING CEO COMPENSATION 
ACCOUNTABLE 10–12 (2007), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/sites/millstein.som.
yale.edu/files/Policy%20Briefing%20No%201%20'Say%20on%20Pay'.pdf; Gordon, supra 
note 12, at 337–54. 
131. Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 21–22. 
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compensation patterns.
132
 Most importantly, supporters contend that such data 
reveals that say on pay increases board accountability because such data indicates 
that say on pay votes do a good job of increasing the likelihood that boards will 
pay closer attention to their obligation to ensure that compensation is appropriately 
aligned with performance. 
Critics question whether say on pay will have any impact on executive 
compensation practices in the United States. Some insist that the differences 
between America and the U.K. may undermine the extent to which similar results 
could occur in America.
133
 Others point out that say on pay in the U.K. has had no 
impact on overall compensation levels, nor has it resulted in more closely 
connecting pay with performance at companies that perform well.
134
 
Critics also fear that say on pay will negatively impact executive pay 
practices.
135
 As an initial matter, some worry about the efficacy of giving 
shareholders a voice in compensation arrangements.
136
 In their view, pay practices 
can be extremely complex, and shareholders may not have the knowledge to 
provide valuable input into executive compensation decisions.
137
 As a result, 
shareholders—and hence boards—may inappropriately rely on proxy advisory 
firms.
138
 Among other things, proxy advisory firms offer advice and guidance to 
shareholders regarding how to vote.
139
 However, such advice may lack in quality 
and integrity, making over-reliance on those votes potentially problematic.
140
 In 
particular, over-reliance on proxy advisory firms may undermine innovation in 
compensation practices, prompting shareholders to support overly conservative 
pay practices. Studies of U.K. pay practices confirm that say on pay appears to 
lead to an over-reliance on proxy advisors coupled with an increase in the 
homogenization of pay practices, which could lead to suboptimal pay 
arrangements at some firms.
141
 
It is also possible that say on pay could lead to an increased reliance on 
compensation consultants in a way that could prove counterproductive and 
ultimately generate an increase in executive compensation at some companies. Not 
                                                                                                                
132. Gordon, supra note 12, at 337–40. 
133. See id. at 352–53. 
134. DAVIS, supra note 130, at 21–22; Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 21–26; 
Lund, supra note 13, at 127–28. 
135. Even Ferri and Maber caution against interpreting their results about a 
positive link between pay and performance to mean that say on pay will lead to superior 
compensation practices. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 3–4. 
136. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, REGULATION, Spring 
2009, at 42, 47; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 695 (2010); Lund, supra note 13, at 129–30. 
137. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 136, at 695. 
138. Gordon, supra note 12, at 351–52. Evidence from the U.K. confirms such 
heightened reliance. See DAVIS, supra note 130, at 12; Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 9. 
139. FAIRFAX, supra note 54, at 60–61. 
140. See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.  
141. See DAVIS, supra note 130, at 12–13; Gordon, supra note 12, at 351–52; 
Lund, supra note 13, at 126–27. 
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only do studies indicate that say on pay leads to increased reliance on 
compensation consultants,
142
 but Dodd–Frank also encourages boards to rely on 
such consultants.
143
 However, such reliance could have negative repercussions. A 
report commissioned by the House of Representatives revealed a pervasive level of 
conflicts of interest among compensation consultants.
144
 These conflicts 
corresponded with higher levels of compensation. Thus, CEO salaries at 
companies with conflicted consultants were significantly higher than the salaries at 
companies that had engaged nonconflicted consultants.
145
 In light of this evidence, 
Dodd–Frank seeks to tackle the problems associated with conflicts related to 
compensation consultants by implementing certain independence standards and 
requiring certain disclosures.
146
 If these measures prove ineffective in reducing 
conflicts of interest associated with compensation consultants, then say on pay 
could also worsen pay practices at some companies. 
Despite these criticisms, reformers have gravitated to say on pay based on 
their belief that it could enhance board accountability. By giving shareholders a 
voice in the compensation decision, say on pay is designed to ensure that directors 
feel greater responsibility toward shareholders, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that directors consider shareholder concerns in their compensation decisions.
147
 
Thus, say on pay is viewed as an antidote to board capture. 
C. Say on Pay and Shareholder Derivative Suits 
Some shareholders are also seeking to use say on pay to bolster director 
accountability through fiduciary duty rules. By August 2011, at least nine 
companies had been subjected to a lawsuit following a say on pay vote. Those 
companies include: Bank of New York Mellon;
148
 Black and Decker;
149
 Beazer 
                                                                                                                
142. Gordon, supra note 12, at 351–52. 
143. See Dodd-Frank Act § 952(b)–(c). 
144. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 
EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS, i, 4 (2007), 
available at http://www.erieri.com/PDF/Executive-Consultant-Conflicts.pdf. 
145. Id. at 6–7 (noting that the median salary and median salary increase were 
higher at companies with highly conflicted compensation consultants). 
146. See Dodd–Frank Act § 952(a). 
147. Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC 
Commissioner: “Restoring Investor Trust Through Corporate Governance”—Remarks 
Before the Practicing Law Institute (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2009/spch021809ebw.htm (noting that say on pay promotes increased board 
accountability); see also Gordon, supra note 12, at 337–40. 
148. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, THE LATEST IN 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: “SAY-ON-PAY” BECOMES “SUE-ON-PAY” 1 (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Article_Say%20on%20Pay_
Allen_1006.pdf. 
149. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. Investor Files Lawsuit Against Directors Over 
Executive Pay, S’HOLDERS FOUND., http://shareholdersfoundation.com/case/stanley-black-
decker-inc-investor-files-lawsuit-against-directors-over-executive-pay (last visited Mar. 4, 
2013) (describing case). 
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Homes USA, Inc.;
150
 Cincinnati Bell, Inc.;
151












 The Bank of New York Mellon lawsuit stands out as 
the only such suit brought after a successful say on pay vote; the other suits 
followed failed say on pay votes. However, in each of the cases shareholders 
allege significant deviations between corporate performance and executive pay. By 
the end of 2011, the number of suits arising after a negative say on pay vote had 




Such suits highlight shareholders’ belief that say on pay votes should 
have repercussions for directors’ duties. All of the cases have claims involving 
                                                                                                                
150. Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 
Teamsters Local 237 Additional Security Benefit Fund v. McCarthy, No. 2011CV197841 
(Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton Cnty. dismissed Sept. 15, 2011), appeal docketed, No. A12A00894 
(Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/
03_15_11_Beazer.pdf. 
151. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Cincinnati Bell, 
Inc., NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, No. 1:11-CV-00451 (S.D. Ohio dismissed July 
18, 2012), available at http://articles.law360.s3.amazonaws.com/0255000/255911//mnt/
rails_cache/https-ecf-ohsd-uscourts-gov-doc1-14313621420.pdf. 
152. See Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Hercules 
Offshore, Inc., Matthews, Sean (Derivatively on Behalf of Hercules v. Hercules Offshore 
Inc.), No. 201134508 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cnty. dismissed Jun. 11, 2012), 2011 WL 
2455436, available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/06_06_11_
Matthews.pdf. 
153. Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Jacobs Engineering Group, 
Inc., Witmer v. Martin, No. BC454543 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. dismissed Mar. 6, 2012), 
2011 WL 3922597, [hereinafter Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. Complaint], available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/02_04_11_Jacobs.pdf. 
154. See Verified Derivative Shareholder Complaint on Behalf of KeyCorp, King 
v. Meyer, No. CV-10-730994, (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Cnty. July 6, 2010), removal 
docketed sub nom. In re KeyCorp Derivative Litigation, No. 1:10CV01786 (N.D. Ohio 
Aug. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 4526934, available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/
ExComp/07_06_10_King.pdf. 
155. See Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., Gusinky v. Irani, No. BC442658 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. dismissed 
Mar. 11, 2011), [hereinafter Occidental Petroleum Corp. Complaint], available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/07_29_10_Occidental.pdf. 
156. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Umpqua Holdings 
Corp., Plumbers Local No. 137 Pension Fund v. Davis, No. 3:11-CV-633 (D. Or. dismissed 
Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://clients.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/umpqua.pdf. 
157. GOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 2; see also Beth I.Z. Boland & Sarah G. Kim, 
How Companies Can Reduce Their Risk of Shareholder Litigation After a Failed “Say on 
Pay” Vote, BINGHAM (June 11, 2012), http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2012/06/Reduce-
Risk-of-Shareholder-Litigation-After-Failed-Say-On-Pay-Vote (discussing the 17 say on 
pay suits in 2011). 
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fiduciary duty breaches.
158
 As an initial matter, shareholders argue that failed say 
on pay votes reflect an independent business judgment that may negate the validity 
of the company’s pay decisions and that such a vote should therefore rebut any 
presumption that the directors complied with their fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the corporation.
159
 Second, in light of the business judgment embedded 
in the shareholders’ negative vote, shareholders contend that directors breached 
their duty by approving compensation packages that were inconsistent with the 
company’s disclosed compensation policies.
160
 Third, shareholders allege that 




Despite shareholders’ efforts to link say on pay with directors’ duties, say 
on pay suits have been dismissed at the pleading stage with overwhelming 
frequency.
162
 Most commentators appear to agree with such dismissals, arguing 
that say on pay suits have no traction both as a descriptive and normative matter.
163
 
This Article contends that such dismissals are a mistake because they ensure that 
fiduciary duty law plays virtually no role in the current reform effort. The next two 
Parts address the rationales for disregarding the role of fiduciary duty law in this 
area, and then challenge the validity of those rationales. 
III. THE APPARENT IRRELEVANCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
At first glance, there are very good reasons to be both pessimistic and 
dismissive regarding the impact of fiduciary duty law on director decision-making 
regarding compensation matters. As an initial matter, courts appear unwilling to 
play a strong role in this area, suggesting that shareholders will face significant 
hurdles in their fiduciary duty litigation. Dodd–Frank and other reforms exacerbate 
                                                                                                                
158. Each of the suits names the executive compensation consultants as 
defendants, alleging that they aided and abetted the directors’ conduct and that they 
breached their contracts with the corporation. See Nelson, supra note 58, at 156. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. 
162. GOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 2; Boland & Kim, supra note 157 (noting that 
only one of 17 suits had survived the motion to dismiss stage). 
163. See Peter M. Saparoff et al., Lessons Learned from Initial “Say-on-Pay” 
Litigation, MINTZ LEVIN SECURITIES REGULATION ALERT (July 18, 2011), 
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2011/Advisories/1251-0711-NAT-LIT/web.htm 
(characterizing allegations as “relatively thin”); Michael D. Blanchard et al., Say on Pay: 
Shareholder “No” Votes Now Leading to Derivative Actions Challenging Executive 
Compensation, BINGHAM (July 7, 2011), http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?
MediaID=12582 (referring to the chances of succeeding say on pay suits that include 
corporate waste claims as being slim); Martin Rosenbaum, If the Shareholders Say “Nay-
On-Pay,” Get Ready for “Sue-on-Pay,” ON SECURITIES (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.onsecurities.com/2011/06/27/if-the-shareholders-say-nayonpay-get-ready-for-
sueonpay/; Kyoko Takahashi Lin & Gillian Emmett Modowan, Perceived Pay-for-
Performance Disconnect Brings Say-On-Pay Shareholder Derivative Suits, DAVIS POLK 
BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (June 24, 2011, 12:29 PM), http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/
corporategovernance/?entry=69 (referring to suits’ validity as questionable). 
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this problem. Moreover, some may insist that fiduciary duty law is unnecessary, 
given say on pay’s impact on compensation decisions. This Part fleshes out each of 
these arguments, while Part IV demonstrates their flaws. 
A. Fiduciary Duty Law’s Hands-Off Approach to Compensation Decisions 
Under existing law, court interpretations of directors’ duties appear to 
foreclose any possibility that say on pay would have an impact on directors’ 
fiduciary duty. In Delaware, shareholder derivative actions involve grappling with 
two overarching issues: procedural rules embodied in the demand process, and 
substantive rules.
164
 Courts’ analysis of both sets of rules makes it exceedingly 
difficult for shareholders to successfully bring claims and hold directors liable for 
breaching their duties,
165
 appearing to confirm the supposition that say on pay suits 
will have little impact on director accountability. 
1. The Demand Hurdle 
The rules surrounding demand make it difficult to use fiduciary duty law 
to curb director behavior because those rules make it difficult to even bring 
lawsuits in this area. Before shareholders can bring a derivative suit they must 
make a demand on the corporation or demonstrate with particularized facts that 
demand is futile and therefore excused.
166
 Shareholders make a demand by 
requesting that the corporation assess the merits of their claims.
167
 If the 
corporation determines that the suit should not proceed, the corporation can seek to 
terminate the suit by filing a motion to dismiss.
168
 Shareholders can only defeat 
such a motion if they prove that the corporation’s decision to dismiss the lawsuit 
was wrongful.
169
 Such a standard is extremely deferential to corporations, making 
                                                                                                                
164. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?: Revitalizing 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408–11 (2005). 
165. Id. at 401–15; see also infra note 170.  
166. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807–08 (Del. 1984), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000); In re Citigroup 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del Ch. 2009); see also Carol B. Swanson, 
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the 
Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349 & n.55 (1993). 
167. Swanson, supra note 166, at 1349–50. In other words, demand involves 
attempting to convince directors to bring suit against themselves or their current or former 
colleagues. Id. The demand requirement is aimed at encouraging shareholders to rely on the 
corporation’s internal procedures to resolve disputes. Id.; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The 
demand requirement is also aimed at reinforcing the corporation’s inherent power to 
determine whether and to what extent it should bring suits to address alleged injuries to the 
corporation. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 120. 
168. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (“Consistent 
with the purpose of requiring a demand, a board decision to cause a derivative suit to be 
dismissed as detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and refused, will be 
respected unless it was wrongful.”). 
169. Id. 
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it almost impossible for shareholders who make a demand to defeat the 
corporation’s motion to dismiss.
170
 
By contrast, if shareholders can demonstrate that the demand is excused, 
they have a greater likelihood of defeating the corporation’s motion to dismiss. 
Given this likelihood, it makes sense that shareholders would choose to forego 
making a demand and instead demonstrate that demand is excused as futile.
171
 To 
be sure, proving demand futility does not guarantee that shareholders will have 
their day in court because corporations can still seek to dismiss the litigation.
172
 
However, if shareholders can demonstrate that demand is excused as futile, courts 
evaluate the corporation’s motion to dismiss under a more stringent standard, 
substantially increasing shareholders’ potential to move beyond the motion to 
dismiss stage.
173
 Thus, proving demand futility is pivotal to shareholders’ ability to 
maintain a successful derivative action. 
In apparent recognition of this reality, say on pay shareholders, generally, 
do not make pre-suit demands and instead argue that the demands were futile and 
therefore excused.
174
 Under the rules established in Aronson v. Lewis, shareholders 
can establish that demand is excused either by raising a reasonable doubt (1) about 
the disinterest and independence of the directors on whom they would have had to 
                                                                                                                
170. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative 
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 326 
(1981); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 286 (1986) (noting that procedural rules have rendered liability rules ineffective); 
Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First 
Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 437 (1996) (noting the difficulty of getting claims through 
court as a result of procedural rules). 
171. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 807–08, 813–15. 
172. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786. 
173. Courts evaluate the motion to dismiss under a more stringent standard 
outlined in the two-part framework pronounced in Zapata v. Maldonado. See id. at 788–89. 
In the first part of that analysis, Zapata shifts the burden to the corporation to prove that its 
dismissal decision was appropriate, by showing that its committee was independent and 
disinterested, conducted a reasonable investigation in good faith, and had a reasonable basis 
for its recommendation. Id. In this part, courts require committees to engage in a process 
that is “like Caesar’s wife”—“above reproach” when they evaluate shareholders’ claims. 
See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055 
(Del. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985)). Even if 
shareholders satisfy this burden, under the second prong of Zapata, courts make their own 
independent assessment of whether the claims should be dismissed. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 
789. Corporations must pass both prongs of Zapata in order for courts to honor the motion 
to dismiss. To be sure, corporations—through their special litigation committees—are very 
often successful in dismissing lawsuits even when demand is excused. But shareholders 
who demonstrate demand futility have a much greater chance of avoiding termination of 
their suit. 
174. See Nelson, supra note 58, at 170. 
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make a demand or (2) that the challenged transactions resulted from a valid 
exercise of the board’s business judgment.
175
 
In their pre-suit demand arguments, shareholders raise assertions under 
both prongs of Aronson. An evaluation of those arguments suggests that 
shareholders will likely find it difficult to demonstrate demand futility and that 
reforms enhance this difficulty. 
2. Demand Futility and Independence 
The first prong of Aronson involves shareholders demonstrating that 
directors lacked the independence necessary to objectively assess the merits of 
shareholders’ claims.
176
 Shareholders generally make such a demonstration by 
pinpointing compromising ties on the part of directors or suggesting that the 
liability risk created by the derivative suit is so high that directors cannot be trusted 
to objectively determine whether the suit should proceed to trial. As this Section 
reveals, satisfying this prong is exceedingly difficult. 
a. Independence and Compromising Ties 
In their say on pay derivative suits, shareholders do not directly challenge 
boards’ independence by suggesting that directors have financial ties to the 
corporation or executives that would undermine their ability to be objective. This 
failure greatly diminishes shareholders’ ability to successfully challenge director 
independence for the purpose of proving demand futility. When determining 
whether a director lacks independence, courts focus primarily, if not exclusively, 
on the extent to which such a director has a financial or other material relationship 
with the corporation or if there are defendants that would interfere with her ability 
to be objective.
177
 When such ties do not exist, it is almost impossible to challenge 
a director’s independence for purposes of demonstrating demand futility.
178
 
Indeed, in the context of demand futility, the Delaware Supreme Court has not 
only emphasized that directors are presumed to be independent but has stressed 
that any ties other than economic or financial ones would normally be insufficient 
to rebut this presumption.
179
 Because courts place significant weight on financial 
ties in assessing director independence, the failure of the say on pay suits to 
pinpoint such ties greatly undermines their ability to prove demand futility on this 
basis. 
                                                                                                                
175. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
176. Id. 
177. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
127, 146–47 (2010). 
178. See id. 
179. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 
A.2d 1040, 1048–54 (Del. 2004) (allegations of social, personal, or business relationships—
without more—cannot be used to rebut the independence presumption in the demand futility 
context); E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. 
REV. 163, 173 (2004) (noting that noneconomic ties such as friendship and social relations 
did not, standing alone, rebut director independence). 
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b. Independence and Liability Risks 
Shareholders are likely to face an uphill battle in proving demand futility 
based on allegations regarding liability risks. Instead of focusing on compromising 
ties, shareholders in each of the say on pay cases contend that demand is futile 
because directors lack independence because of the high likelihood they will face 
liability if the derivative action is successful. Although demand can be excused 
based on the possibility of director liability, this possibility must be extremely 
likely.
180
 Courts have held that the demand will not be excused as futile simply 
because shareholders would be asking directors to sue themselves.
181
 Courts also 
have repeatedly dismissed shareholder efforts to prove demand futility in executive 
compensation cases where shareholders have alleged that directors breached their 
duty by approving wasteful pay packages or otherwise failing to properly evaluate 
the merits of such packages.
182
 Instead, because directors rarely incur liability for 
compensation-related decisions, courts reason that their liability risks are not very 
high.
183
 In this respect, it is almost a catch-22: Given the low liability risk 
associated with suits related to executive compensation, shareholders will face an 
uphill climb to show that directors have sufficient liability risk to justify excusing 
demand. 
3. Demand Futility and the Duty of Care 
Shareholders face similar hurdles with trying to satisfy the second prong 
of Aronson. That prong essentially requires shareholders to demonstrate that they 
are likely to prevail on the merits of their claims by raising doubts that the 
challenged transactions were consistent with directors’ fiduciary responsibilities.
184
 
This Article examines shareholder allegations that fall into two broad categories: 
claims involving a breach of the duty of care and claims involving waste.
 
 
As an initial matter, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate a breach of the 
duty of care. When directors engage in misconduct that does not involve a conflict 
of interest, their actions are evaluated under the duty of care.
185
 Directors have a 
duty of care to act in a reasonably informed manner and to take actions that 
advance the corporation’s best interests.
186
 Courts analyze whether directors have 
breached this duty of care under the business judgment rule.
187
 The rule’s 
presumption is that directors have acted in the best interests of the corporation.
188
 
Courts rely on such a rule based on an extreme reluctance to second-guess the 
                                                                                                                
180. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815; In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig., 
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business decisions of the board.
189
 Hence, in evaluating whether decisions satisfy 
the business judgment rule, courts focus almost exclusively on the process by 
which directors made their decision.
190
 So long as the process is sufficient, courts 
will not probe the substance of the decision, even if the decision can be viewed as 
a poor one or a mistake.
191
 Indicative of this relatively lax standard, only a handful 
of cases have found directors liable for breaching their duty of care, and only one 
case has imposed personal liability on directors for breaching their duty of care.
192
 
In this respect, the business judgment rule makes it extremely unlikely that 
shareholders can prove demand futility by demonstrating a potential duty of care 
breach. 
The fact that say on pay cases involve executive compensation claims 
only makes matters worse. Directors’ duty of care includes an obligation to take 
appropriate care when establishing and approving executive pay packages. For 
example, a breach of duty of care is when a shareholder claims that directors 
breached their duty by approving pay packages that were not in the best interest of 
the corporation. However, when analyzing the kind of process that directors must 
meet in order to satisfy their duty of care involving executive compensation 
decisions, courts have been tolerant of extremely lax procedures. With respect to 
compensation decisions, courts begin by pointing out that directors’ decision-
making process need not be pristine.
193
 Instead, courts have held that directors 
satisfied their fiduciary duty even when directors follow a process that falls far 
below best practices.
194
 Also, courts have found that directors satisfied their duty 
of care even after characterizing their process as “casual, if not sloppy and 
perfunctory.”
195
 In one case, directors were deemed to satisfy their duty of care 
even when there were indications that their compensation decision was made 
without sufficient information and deliberation regarding critical aspects of the 
                                                                                                                
189. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); 
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746 A.2d 244, 260–62 (Del. 2000); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996), 
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NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2003). 
195. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249. 
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compensation arrangement.
196
 Importantly, the court in one case acknowledged 
that the challenged compensation appeared to be exceedingly lucrative when 
compared to the value provided by the executive.
197
 Thus, even when there is an 
apparent pay-for-performance disconnect, Delaware courts require directors to 
meet a fairly easy procedural hurdle, which almost eradicates any potential to 
prove demand futility based on a breach of the duty of care. 
4. Demand and Waste 
The other avenue shareholders can pursue in their demand futility claim is 
to demonstrate a significant likelihood that the challenged transactions are 
wasteful. Some of the say on pay lawsuits allege that directors’ actions were 
wasteful because directors approved payment schemes that gave executives 
significant compensation despite their lackluster performance.
198
 
Like the duty of care more generally, proving demand futility with respect 
to waste is extremely challenging. Waste claims are difficult to prove precisely 
because courts do not feel comfortable second-guessing board decisions. Thus, a 
board decision must be truly egregious to satisfy the waste claim. To excuse 
demand based on waste, shareholders must plead facts that lead to an inference 
that directors authorized a transaction that is so one-sided that no rational 
businessperson would conclude that the corporation received proper consideration 
for the transaction.
199
 One court described waste as involving a showing that “there 
was ‘an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small 
as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to 
trade.’”
200
 Delaware courts have made clear that waste is almost impossible to 
demonstrate.
201




A demand futility claim based on waste is especially difficult when the 
transaction involves executive compensation. Courts grant directors wide 
                                                                                                                
196. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 56–57. 
197. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249. 
198. See, e.g., Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. Complaint, supra note 153, at 15; 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. Complaint, supra note 155, at 24.  
199. In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch. 
2009); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
200. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263). 
201. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748–49 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (noting that corporate waste is very rarely found in Delaware courts); see also Andrea 
M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 1005 (2009) (noting that 
Delaware courts rarely find that directors have committed corporate waste); Julian Velasco, 
How Many Fiduciary Duties are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1255–
56 (2010) (noting that waste requires shareholders to prove an extremely heavy burden that 
is rarely satisfied). 
202. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554–55 (Del. 2001); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 
263–64; Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ. A. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 & n.39 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 28, 2003). 
32 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 55:1 
discretion in the area of executive compensation.
203
 This is because courts believe 
that they are “ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration under 
the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business risk.”
204
 
Hence, although there are cases in which courts have acknowledged that executive 
compensation appears to be extremely lucrative or otherwise unconnected to 
performance, courts have not been willing to characterize such compensation as 
wasteful.
205
 In fact, the Delaware case that established the demand futility rules 
involved a compensation agreement that guaranteed an executive’s compensation 
for life and provided that the compensation would not be affected by the 
executive’s inability to perform.
206
 Although there were no allegations that he was 
in poor health, the executive was 75 years old at the time directors approved the 
agreement.
207
 When concluding that shareholders’ allegations were insufficient to 
demonstrate demand futility based on waste, the court did not make any significant 
probe into the reasonableness of the package, but rather emphasized directors’ 
broad powers to set compensation.
208
 This underscores the extreme deference 
courts grant directors, while highlighting the Herculean task say on pay 
shareholders appear to face when seeking to prove demand futility. 
5. On the Merits 
Available empirical evidence has failed to unearth cases in which 
directors have been held liable for committing waste or for breaching their duty 
related to executive pay practices.
209
 This is likely correlated to the difficulties 
shareholders confront when seeking to overcome the demand hurdle and get their 
day in court related to such claims.
210
 Yet even when shareholders manage to 
overcome the significant hurdles involved with proving demand futility, available 
empirical evidence indicates that they are never successful on the merits.
211
 
B. Dodd–Frank on Fiduciary Duty 
Reforms appear to further undermine shareholder efforts to rely on 
fiduciary duty rules to curb excessive executive compensation in at least three 
ways. First, Dodd–Frank seeks to decouple say on pay from issues related to 
fiduciary duty, undermining any effort to use say on pay as a platform for altering 
fiduciary duty law related to executive compensation.
212
 Dodd–Frank states that 
the say on pay vote may not be construed (a) as overruling board or corporate 
decisions or (b) as creating or implying any change or addition to the fiduciary 
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duties of the corporation or directors.
213
 In this way, Dodd–Frank appears to negate 
shareholders’ efforts to use say on pay to reshape fiduciary duty law. 
Second, Dodd–Frank encourages reliance on processes that are likely to 
increase courts’ willingness to defer to directors’ compensation decisions, further 
solidifying courts’ relatively hands-off approach to overseeing such decisions. 
Compliance with Dodd–Frank almost guarantees that directors will be deemed free 
from compromising ties, which further diminishes shareholders’ ability to 
successfully prove demand futility based on the directors’ lack of independence. 
Dodd–Frank requires compensation committees to be independent from the 
corporation and its managers.
214
 Dodd–Frank also requires that directors select 
compensation committee consultants and advisors only after their independence is 
fully considered, including the amount of fees provided to such consultants, 
business or personal relationships with committee members, the provision of other 
services, and any potential conflicts of interest.
215
 These rules direct the committee 
to consider ties outside of financial ones.
216
 In this respect, Dodd–Frank’s rules 
surrounding independence appear more stringent than those under Delaware law, 
which does not take social or personal relationships into account in the 
independence inquiry.
217
 More importantly, if boards satisfy such rules, their 
actions significantly decrease the probability that courts will consider directors to 
lack independence for demand futility purposes.
218
 
Corporate adherence to reforms also increases the likelihood that courts 
will look favorably upon the process by which directors determine compensation, 
thereby virtually guaranteeing that courts will not delve too deeply into the 
substance of those decisions. Post Dodd–Frank, compensation committees report 
meeting longer, and more frequently, and focusing more attention on 
compensation matters,
219
 thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be 
deemed to have followed adequate procedures when setting executive pay. Dodd–
Frank’s director independence requirement, as well as its emphasis on 
compensation consultants, should further safeguard board decisions from duty of 
care challenges. Notwithstanding significant evidence questioning the validity of 
relying on independent directors,
220
 courts view reliance on such directors as 
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important procedurally.
221
 Thus, when independent directors make decisions, 
courts give their decisions significant deference.
222
 Moreover, despite evidence 
that compensation consultants may encourage excesses in executive pay,
223
 courts 
have suggested that reliance on outside consultants helps insulate compensation 
decisions.
224
 Compliance with these reforms likely weakens shareholders’ chances 
of attacking the validity of directors’ decisions. 
From this perspective, the provisions underlying Dodd–Frank bolster the 
view that fiduciary duty law will not play a role in regulating executive 
compensation. Of course Part IV will illustrate that such a perspective may not be 
entirely accurate. However, the perceived wisdom regarding the futility of 
fiduciary duty suits sets the stage for reforms such as say on pay that shun reliance 
on those suits.  
C. The Promise of Say on Pay 
The fact that say on pay has impacted director decision-making appears to 
negate the need for fiduciary duty law. 
1. Assessing the Vote Results 
Available U.S. data indicates that shareholders have overwhelmingly 
approved executive pay packages by wide margins. Say on pay votes became 
mandatory on January 21, 2011.
225
 Current data incorporates votes covering nearly 
two proxy seasons. In the 2011 proxy season, more than two-thirds of companies 
received 90% or more support for their pay packages.
226
 By contrast, only 1.6% of 
companies had their pay packages rejected for that same period.
227
 Similarly, as of 
September 2012, more than 70% of companies received 90% or more support for 
their pay packages, with a slightly larger rejection rate of 2.6%.
228
 
Moreover, shareholders have approved such packages over the objection 
of proxy advisory firms. Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”)—by far the most dominant of such firms—issue 
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recommendations regarding how shareholders should vote.
229
 There is 
considerable debate regarding the extent to which such firms influence shareholder 
voting.
230
 Consistent with this debate, many expressed concern that advisory firm 
recommendations would significantly (and inappropriately) influence 
shareholders’ willingness to approve executive pay arrangements.
231
 However, in 
2011, 86% of companies that received a negative ISS recommendation garnered 
approval for their pay packages.
232
 Moreover, the average support for companies 
with a negative recommendation was about 73% in 2011,
233
 and roughly 64% in 
2012.
234
 To be sure, shareholders in 2011 only rejected pay packages at companies 
that also received a negative proxy firm recommendation.
235
 Of course, one can 
debate whether the recommendation influenced shareholder voting or simply 
reflected shareholder concerns.
236
 Regardless, although a negative ISS 
recommendation corresponded with lower shareholder support,
237
 shareholders 
nevertheless strongly supported pay packages at the bulk of companies where such 
recommendations were made.
238
 Such support is consistent with the broader trend 
of shareholders approving highly lucrative pay packages by wide margins. 
2. The Impact of Nay on Pay 
The U.K. experience suggests that the percentage of negative pay votes in 
the United States may be more significant than it appears. The rate of rejections in 
the United States is higher than in the U.K. Over a period of six years, only eight
239
 
or nine U.K. companies had their say on pay votes defeated.
240
 Evidence also 
suggests that the percentage of negative votes increases as shareholders grow more 
comfortable exercising their power.
241
 If U.S. voting patterns mimic this 
experience, then the rejection rates may increase over the next few proxy seasons. 
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Hence, negative votes are already higher than those in the U.K. and are likely to 
rise. 
The relatively low percentage of negative votes may be viewed as a 
positive signal, demonstrating that shareholders are exercising their vote 
responsibly. Some opponents of say on pay were concerned that shareholders 
would categorically reject pay practices at any firm where there was a pay-for-
performance disconnect or where CEO salaries increased.
242
 However, many 
corporations won approval of their pay practices even when there appeared to be a 
disconnect between pay and performance.
243
 Corporations received overwhelming 
approval of pay packages despite a 33% increase in median CEO salaries at S&P 
500 companies.
244
 Studies suggest that institutional shareholders have made efforts 
not only to become more knowledgeable about compensation structures and 
policies,
245
 but also to increase their engagement with directors around 
compensation matters. As a result, even when a company’s pay practices could be 
viewed as problematic, shareholders approved such practices so long as they 
received some comfort that corporate managers had considered shareholder 
concerns and were making efforts to address them.
246
 In this respect, the low levels 
of rejection could be viewed as a positive sign that shareholders have used their 
rejection power sparingly and responsibly. 
Negative say on pay votes not only prompted boards to consider different 
pay practices, but also led boards to modify their practices in ways that 
incorporated shareholder concerns.
247
 For example, at least one company has 
added performance metrics to its cash bonus program so such bonuses would be 
contingent on corporate performance.
248
 Another company added performance 
conditions to previously issued restricted stock and stock options.
249
 While it is too 
soon to determine if these changes will be beneficial or have their intended result, 
such changes reveal that shareholder rejection influences corporate conduct. 
Proxy data reveals that negative votes related to frequency caused 
companies to alter their frequency recommendations and policies. In the beginning 
of the 2011 proxy season, many companies recommended that say on pay votes be 
conducted every three years.
250
 However, shareholders tended to reject triennial 
recommendations, instead clearly preferring annual votes.
251
 In light of this 
rejection, most companies shifted away from triennial recommendations toward 
annual recommendations in the latter half of the proxy season.
252
 Importantly, 
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although the frequency vote is advisory, most companies also have indicated that 
they will follow the proposal favored by shareholders.
253
 
A negative say on pay vote also has significant spillover effects. Perhaps 
most significantly, existing evidence reveals that such votes impact shareholder 
voting for directors. Thus, one study found that at companies where pay packages 
were rejected, compensation committee directors received on average 13.5% fewer 
votes than other directors on the ballot.
254
 
3. The Impact of Yea on Pay 
Even positive votes may reflect the influence of say on pay. For example, 
positive say on pay votes may be a signal of corporations’ increased engagement 
with shareholders. One potential benefit of say on pay is that it encourages more 
effective board–shareholder communication, allowing directors and shareholders 
to reach consensus on pay structures and policies, thereby eliminating the need for 
conflict and any negative votes.
255
 Available empirical evidence reveals that when 
ISS recommended a negative say on pay vote, many companies filed additional 
disclosure documents aimed at clarifying and defending their compensation 
practices.
256
 These efforts appeared to be successful because 73% of companies 
that received a negative recommendation from ISS managed to get shareholder 
approval of their packages, with an average shareholder support of 73%.
257
 Even 
companies that received positive ISS recommendations reported reaching out to 
shareholders prior to the say on pay vote.
258
 In this regard, positive say on pay 
votes may reflect companies’ more robust communication with shareholders.
259
 
Positive say on pay votes also may reveal corporations’ decisions to alter 
pay arrangements in anticipation of such votes. Available empirical evidence 
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indicates that companies prepared for the 2011 and 2012 say on pay votes by 
instituting more performance-based compensation plans,
260
 changing their 
compensation processes in a way that better responds to shareholder views.
261
 
4. Concluding Thoughts 
It is too soon to tell if changes wrought by say on pay will prove 
beneficial. On the one hand, policies advocated by shareholders may not result in 
increasing the link between pay and performance or reducing the gap between 
executive pay and the pay of average workers. On the other hand, even if 
compensation policies have their intended impact on pay practices, it is not clear 
whether or to what extent those policies will impact corporate performance or 
reduce corporate misconduct. 
However, say on pay has made directors more sensitive to shareholder 
concerns, thereby boosting director accountability. Hence, one may legitimately 
question the necessity of fiduciary duty law. The next Part responds to that 
question. 
IV. RECONFIRMING THE RELEVANCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY LAW 
In contrast to the previous Part, this Part not only makes the normative 
case for why courts should use say on pay litigation to alter the manner in which 
they assess executive compensation decisions, but also insists that Dodd–Frank 
should not serve as an impediment to that alteration.  
A. Dodd–Frank as an Invitation 
Rather than construing Dodd–Frank as a prohibition against alterations in 
fiduciary duty law, it could be construed as federal legislators’ exercise of 
deference coupled with an invitation for state courts to re-examine fiduciary duty 
law. Several corporate governance scholars have sharply criticized previous 
federal reforms because they intruded on corporate governance matters generally 
regulated under state corporate law.
262
 Dodd–Frank’s provisions on fiduciary duty 
law may be viewed as a response to this criticism. In this respect, it may be a 
mistake to conclude, as some courts have, that Dodd–Frank aims to preserve the 
existing framework with respect to fiduciary duty law.
263
 This is particularly true 
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given federal legislators apparent disappointment with the accountability 
mechanism under state law, including fiduciary duty law.
264
 Indeed, it is more 
likely that federal regulators may welcome state reform in this area, and thus that 
Dodd–Frank should be viewed as an effort to recognize the states’ authority in this 
area. Such clear recognition does not prohibit state courts from making changes to 
fiduciary duty law. In this respect, Dodd–Frank should not serve as a bar to state 
court efforts aimed at altering the standard for reviewing fiduciary duty breaches 
related to executive pay. 
B. Debunking the Relevancy Myth 
This Section advances the case for enhancing the courts’ role in 
regulating fiduciary duty breaches related to executive compensation decisions 
from both a descriptive and normative perspective. As a descriptive matter, the 
Section debunks the widely held belief that courts have been categorically 
unwilling to scrutinize director pay decisions more closely. This Section also 
reveals how disclosure rules may reduce a court’s concerns regarding its capacity 
to properly assess such decisions, which increases the likelihood that courts can 
oversee director decisions in a measured manner. Normatively, the Section 
highlights several reasons why courts should embrace such oversight, including 
reasons related to the limits of say on pay, the importance of state regulation, and 
the importance of an appropriately balanced shareholder voice. 
1. A Second Look at Fiduciary Duty 
Contrary to the perceived wisdom on this issue, courts have been willing 
to play a more enhanced role in monitoring pay decisions—at least episodically. 
The Delaware Supreme Court recently underscored the potential for shareholders 
challenging compensation decisions to demonstrate demand futility based on 
waste. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Court noted that “there is an outer limit to [the 
board’s] discretion [to set executive compensation], at which point a decision of 
the directors on executive compensation is so disproportionately large as to be 
unconscionable and constitute waste.”
265
 This language appeared to open the door 
for a more rigorous analysis of compensation claims under the waste doctrine. 
In a shareholder derivative action involving Citigroup, the Delaware 
Chancery Court relied on that dicta from Brehm v. Eisner when it allowed 
shareholders challenging an executive compensation decision to survive a motion 
to dismiss.
266
 In that case, directors approved a $68 million retirement payment for 
a CEO who retired after the company suffered billions of dollars in losses.
267
 The 
court found that the payment agreement failed to demonstrate the value of the 
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services being provided in exchange for such a payment.
268
 As a result, the court 
concluded that there was reasonable doubt regarding whether the agreement was 
one-sided, and thus wasteful, which satisfied the demand futility standard.
269
 In 
light of the historical reluctance to excuse demand based on waste, experts agree 
that this case seems to weaken the heavy burden imposed on shareholders.
270
 
The courts’ pronouncements in Citigroup and Brehm negate blanket 
assumptions that lawsuits in this area are not viable. Although shareholders clearly 
confront a heavy burden, it may not be insurmountable. Instead, waste appears to 
be a viable measure to plead demand futility in a manner that allows a suit to 
proceed on the merits. 
Moreover, outside of these recent decisions, there is evidence that courts 
have been willing to provide more exacting scrutiny of executive compensation 
decisions, even if only episodically. Many contend that fiduciary duty law is an 
inappropriate vehicle for policing pay practices because courts are ill-equipped to 
evaluate decisions related to compensation, whereas boards are better positioned to 
analyze the sufficiency of pay arrangements.
271
 This concern about judicial 
competency animates the wide discretion courts afford boards when assessing 
fiduciary duty claims. However, courts have recognized that when there exists a 
possibility that directors may abuse their discretion, a more stringent standard of 
review is necessary. More importantly, courts have applied more exacting scrutiny 
even in connection with executive compensation matters, suggesting that there are 
circumstances in which courts are able to overcome these competency concerns.
272
 
Thus, after reviewing almost 90 years of reported cases, Professors Randall 
Thomas and Harwell Wells conclude that “[c]ontrary to the received 
wisdom . . . courts have not been uniformly hostile to challenges to executive 
compensation. From time to time, courts have applied heightened scrutiny to either 
the process or substance of executive compensation decisions.”
273
 This evidence 
reveals that although the complexity of compensation decisions has made courts 
reluctant to interfere with them, there have been times when courts have overcome 
that reluctance and thus looked more closely at executive pay practices. 
2. Help from Corporate Disclosure 
Say on pay suits primarily challenge board decision-making by referring 
to corporate disclosures regarding pay policies and suggesting that there is a 
                                                                                                                
268. See id. 
269. See id. at 139. 
270. See, e.g., Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: 
How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive 
Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 119 (2010). 
271. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997); see Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting the importance of boards exercising their 
business judgment in context of claims related to executive pay); See also BEBCHUK & 
FRIED, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing inadequacy of courts regarding executive 
compensation). 
272. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 880. 
273. See id. 
2013] SUE ON PAY 41 
disconnect between a particular pay package and such disclosures.
274
 Along these 
same lines, such disclosures enable courts to analyze the appropriateness of board 
decisions with reference to a board’s own stated policies. Such an analysis may 
help alleviate the courts’ concerns about capacity for several reasons. First, it does 
not require courts to assess the appropriateness of compensation per se—an 
assessment that is not only challenging, and potentially outside of the realm of 
judicial competency given the wide divergence in views regarding appropriate pay 
levels, but also one that may be better determined by the directors who are elected 
by shareholders. Second, by focusing on whether a particular compensation 
package is compatible with disclosed policies, these disclosures enable courts to 
defer to the directors’ decision regarding appropriate pay policies at their 
companies. Third, it does not require courts to apply a one-size-fits-all model of 
compensation, and thus does not stifle private ordering or innovation by 
corporations. To be sure, focusing on corporate disclosure does not resolve all the 
complexity issues associated with seeking to measure the appropriateness of 
executive compensation, particularly because such disclosure may be too broad to 
provide meaningful guidance.
275
 However, at the very least, it does provide a 
critical starting point in this area, and in many cases a robust measuring tool for 
analyzing executive compensation. By providing courts with at least the 
beginnings of a yardstick by which to measure each pay package, corporate 
disclosures not only facilitate court oversight in this area, but also may enable that 
oversight to be less onerous and intrusive. 
3. The Limits of Say on Pay 
The foregoing two Subsections demonstrate why directors can oversee 
board decisions. The next Subsections illustrate why courts should engage in such 
oversight. As an initial matter, although say on pay votes (whether negative or 
positive) appear to influence corporate decision-making related to executive 
compensation, it would be unwise to rely exclusively on say on pay to fill the 
accountability gap. Corporations can, and have indicated that they will, ignore say 
on pay votes. Say on pay votes, like most shareholder proposals, are nonbinding.
276
 
As a result, corporations are not required to change their practices or policies 
because of a negative vote. Empirical evidence reveals that in the past corporations 
routinely ignored shareholder proposals even when they received significant 
shareholder support over several years.
277
 Such evidence underscores the fragility 
of the say on pay vote. Hence, such votes may be only a partial solution to 
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excessive pay practices, which underscores the continued need for fiduciary duty 
law. 
Fiduciary duty litigation also may serve as a critical supplement to say on 
pay. Indeed, companies whose pay practices were rejected by courts failed to 
consider shareholder concerns both before the shareholder vote and afterwards. 
However, such companies have announced significant changes to their executive 
compensation practices following the institution of shareholder derivative suits.
278
 
In this respect, lawsuits may be more effective at prompting responses from 
particular companies. There also is a possibility that the threat of lawsuits may 
enhance the influence of the say on pay vote by encouraging directors to pay heed 
to shareholder concerns in order to avoid such suits. In this way, lawsuits may 
have a critical role to play even with the existence of say on pay. 
Given that say on pay cannot completely fill the accountability gap, it is 
critical that fiduciary duty law have some role in policing executive compensation. 
Because fiduciary duty law is the primary accountability mechanism at the state 
level, it seems inappropriate to allow courts to excuse themselves from their 
policing responsibilities. 
4. Counteracting Bias 
There is a strong likelihood that compensation decisions as a general 
matter may be negatively influenced by compromising ties, warranting increased 
scrutiny of such decisions. When there is a possibility that directors’ decisions may 
result from bias, or may be influenced by their relationships with managers, 
Delaware courts apply a higher level of scrutiny to those decisions.
279
 In this 
respect, while courts may afford directors deference based on a concern about their 
competency to judge business decisions, courts put aside that deference and 
concern for decisions or cases in which deference may not be appropriate. 
Compensation decisions are precisely the kind of decisions where that 
deference needs to be put aside for at least two reasons. First, there is a high 
probability that director decisions on this issue are influenced by relationships that 
undermine directors’ objectivity and therefore merit closer judicial attention. 
Indeed, when assessing the kinds of relationships that may undermine a director’s 
objectivity, courts focus only on economic or financial relationships.
280
 Thus, 
despite social science research revealing the compromising nature of social ties 
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and structural bias,
281
 courts have been largely unwilling to consider the impact of 
such ties when evaluating director behavior.
282
 As a result, courts have deferred to 
compensation decisions made by directors who have strong social ties with 
executives. For example, Disney’s board chair Michael Eisner orchestrated the 
compensation package of Michael Ovitz, who received some $140 million after 
having served as president for little more than a year.
283
 In assessing Eisner’s 
independence, the court gave no weight to the fact that Eisner had been friends 
with Ovitz for some 25 years.
284
 By failing to appropriately consider the 
compromising nature of these noneconomic ties, the court gave undue deference to 
Eisner and missed an opportunity to challenge his compensation decision. Such a 
failure should be rectified. Courts should consider the impact of noneconomic ties 
in the same way they consider the impact of other ties that undermine directors’ 
objectivity and therefore necessitate more exacting judicial scrutiny. To be sure, 
courts’ refusal to consider noneconomic ties applies to all decisions. However, that 
refusal may be particularly problematic for executive compensation decisions 
because of the extreme deference courts appear to grant those decisions. 
Second, there is a high probability that director decisions in this area are 
influenced by inappropriate biases that skew such decisions in favor of 
management. Like noneconomic ties, courts tend to ignore theories suggesting that 
directors who are former or current executives tend to have a bias toward giving 
managers the freedom to make decisions, and are otherwise unduly influenced by 
management in ways that result in their approval of higher compensation.
285
 
Ignoring this evidence is particularly problematic given that a significant number 
of directors are active or former executives.
286
 Directors who are current or former 
executives are not only most likely to serve on the compensation committee, but 
are also most likely to chair that committee.
287
 A 2010 board study revealed that 
63% of committee chairs were active or retired CEOs.
288
 In light of the evidence 
indicating such directors’ bias with respect to pay practices, their domination on 
the compensation committee is troubling. Moreover, such domination bolsters the 
case for courts to apply more searching scrutiny in this area. 
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5. The Importance of a State Voice 
Another critical reason why fiduciary law should be revitalized is that 
there are benefits to relying on regulation at the state level through the 
enforcement of state fiduciary duty laws, as opposed to looking exclusively at 
federal regulation. Relying on fiduciary duty law enables us to take advantage of 
these benefits. 
Enhancing fiduciary duty law may be an important mechanism for 
counteracting any of the potentially negative repercussions of increased 
shareholder influence in this area. Shareholders are clearly concerned about 
excessive executive compensation. Moreover, they have clearly demonstrated that 
they will agitate for reform in this area. This is reflected in the dominance of 
executive compensation issues in the shareholder proposal process.
289
 More 
importantly, many critical shareholder empowerment campaigns were rooted in 
shareholder frustration with executive compensation.
290
 This includes the majority-
vote movement, the acceleration of withhold-the-vote campaigns, and the 
campaign to eliminate discretionary broker voting.
291
 Importantly, these campaigns 
have garnered support where many others have not.
292
 One critical reason why 
shareholders have increased their activism is their frustration with the courts’ 
unwillingness to play a more significant role in the process. Importantly, the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Disney to refrain from holding directors 
liable for their haphazard decision-making and their approval of a seemingly 
excessive pay package ignited shareholder fury and accelerated shareholders’ 
activism surrounding a host of executive pay reforms.
293
 In this regard, if courts 
indicate a willingness to play a more effective role in managing executive 
compensation, it is likely to reduce shareholder activism in this area, which can be 
costly and distracting to both shareholders and corporations. 
State courts also should reconsider their approach to fiduciary duty law in 
order to avoid further federal intrusion in this area. The public outrage and 
corresponding wave of federal reforms clearly underscore the federal 
government’s deep concern with corporate pay practices, as well as the 
government’s increased willingness to police those practices in ways that intrude 
on states’ traditional authority. To be sure, in light of the efforts made under 
Dodd–Frank to preserve states’ role in fiduciary law, such intrusion may be 
construed as measured. However, there is no guarantee that further inroads will not 
                                                                                                                
289. See Reeder, supra note 10, at 141. 
290. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 8 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT], 
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf  (discussing broker voting 
issues with reference to executive compensation votes); Fairfax, supra note 72, at 61–70 
(discussing genesis of withhold the vote and majority voting campaigns). 
291. See Fairfax, supra note 72, at 61–70; see also WORKING GROUP REPORT, 
supra note 290.  
292. See Fairfax, supra note 72, at 66–67; see also Bebchuk, supra note 277, at 
854 (noting shareholder proposals eliminating staggered boards).  
293. Fairfax, supra note 72, at 61–88. 
2013] SUE ON PAY 45 
occur. Instead, it is entirely possible that if state courts persist in not playing a role 
in better policing compensation arrangements, public outrage could prompt more 
drastic federal intrusion. Viewed through this lens, Dodd–Frank may be viewed as 
a warning that state inaction could lead to a minimization of state’s role in this 
area.   
Significant federal intrusion could be problematic. Indeed, the primary 
justification for federalism in general and the enabling nature of state corporate 
laws in particular is that they foster innovation and healthy risk-taking.
294
 By 
contrast, federal regulations, which often come in the form of uniform mandates, 
are viewed as stifling innovation in a way that could lead to suboptimal decision-
making. Notably, the dominant critique of federal intervention in corporate law 
centers around the undesirability of displacing the innovation that often stems from 
private ordering with federal mandates. This critique highlights the necessity of the 
states’ role in corporate governance practices. 
However, to the extent there is any validity to the federalism claim, it is 
likely that fiduciary duty law also must play a central role in corporate governance 
practices. There is considerable debate regarding whether corporations and states 
have sufficient incentives to innovate at optimal levels.
295
 In the context of 
executive compensation, there is every reason to believe that federalism—that is, 
the notion that states and corporations should be allowed to generate policies free 
from federal intrusion—may have encouraged excessive risk-taking and permitted 
inefficient pay practices, particularly with respect to pay policies for banks.
296
 
However, federal mandates not only may encourage inefficient homogenization of 
such practices,
297
 but they may also encourage undue reliance on mechanisms that 
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undermine accountability and increase the potential for excessive pay.
298
 These 
observations suggest that even though the benefits of federalism may be 
overstated, such benefits may nevertheless exist and thus should be harnessed.
299
 
State fiduciary duty law has a vital role to play in such an endeavor.
300
 Corporate 
fiduciary law serves as the primary check on corporate innovation and risk-taking, 
ensuring that such actions occur within acceptable boundaries.
301
 From this 
perspective, federalism may be undesirable if we cannot depend upon state 
fiduciary duty law to police corporate innovation. More importantly, the federal 
government may be less inclined to allow states and corporations the freedom to 
innovate if it cannot be assured that fiduciary duty law will play a role in curbing 
excesses associated with such innovation. 
C. Say on Pay as the Perfect Storm 
This Section argues that say on pay is an ideal platform for courts to use in 
their efforts at reinvigorating their oversight regarding compensation matters for 
several reasons. Because directors’ fiduciary responsibilities include appropriately 
considering shareholder concerns, the results of shareholders’ vote on 
compensation matters should play some role in courts’ analysis regarding whether 
directors effectively performed such responsibilities. The rarity of shareholder 
rejection in this area only underscores the importance of ensuring that boards and 
courts pay closer attention to such rejections when analyzing board adherence with 
their duties. Finally, the fact that the absolute number of negative say on pay votes 
has been relatively low necessarily limits the number of potential cases in this area, 
increasing the likelihood that courts may be able to provide important signals 
regarding pay practices in an environment where the costs of litigation may be 
lower as compared to the potential cases that can be brought with regard to 
compensation matters more generally.   
1. Shareholder Concerns and the Say on Pay Vote 
One justification for increasing judicial scrutiny in the context of say on 
pay suits relates to the importance of ensuring that boards consider shareholder 
concerns in their pay decisions. 
Corporate governance experts agree that boards have an obligation to 
consider shareholder concerns, and courts should ensure that boards take that 
obligation seriously. In 2009, The Conference Board convened a task force of 
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corporate governance experts to address problems associated with executive 
compensation pay processes and oversight.
302
 The task force issued a report and 
recommendation, which contained five guiding principles, including one focused 
on maintaining credible board oversight.
303
 As part of the oversight principle, The 
Conference Board argued that in order for boards to perform their oversight roles 
effectively, they should “[t]hink and act like an owner.”
304
 Hence, governance 
experts agree that directors fulfill their oversight responsibilities only when they 
appropriately consider shareholder concerns.
305
 
The negative say on pay vote reflects a very important embodiment of 
shareholder concerns. The fact that shareholders’ assessment diverges significantly 
from the directors’ assessment suggests that directors may not be “thinking [or 
acting] like owners” in the manner recommended by The Conference Board.
306
 
2. The Strength of the Signal 
Shareholder rejection is significant not only because it is relatively rare, 
but also because it is often difficult for shareholder proposals that run counter to 
managerial recommendations to obtain majority shareholder approval. Such 
difficulties arise from the fact that shareholders have diverse interests and may not 
agree on particular policies,
307
 as well as the fact that most shareholders tend to 
follow management recommendations.
308
 Historically, there were very few issues 
on which shareholders managed to garner majority support.
309
 From this 
perspective, the fact that a majority (and in many cases a substantial majority) of 
shareholders agree that a pay package is problematic should be viewed as 
significant and should be given weight when assessing the appropriateness of 
executive compensation packages. 
3. Minimizing the Impact of Litigation 
Because a negative say on pay vote is relatively rare, any heightened 
scrutiny surrounding litigation related to such votes will be reserved to a subset of 
companies and their compensation decisions. Thus, even if shareholders decided to 
aggressively pursue litigation in this area, the absolute number of potential cases is 
limited. This potentially minimizes the amount of litigation in this area, while 
enabling courts to send an important message about the boundaries of acceptable 
pay practices. Importantly, it generally only takes one case to set the tone 
regarding the appropriate role of directors. Thus, even if there are relatively few 
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challenges in this area, Delaware only needs to consider and decide one case in 
order to make a lasting impact on director behavior. This means that paving the 
way for increased litigation of this variety is more ideal than litigation regarding 
compensation issues more generally simply because the latter pool is far greater 
than the pool involving say on pay suits. 
Of course, some may be concerned that the mere fact that say on pay 
votes could impact fiduciary duty law will influence shareholder voting. On the 
one hand, shareholders may be concerned about the serious repercussions that 
could stem from their vote and hence may be more reluctant to reject pay 
packages. On the other hand, some shareholders may use the say on pay vote 
strategically to increase their chances of success in the litigation process. As a 
result, litigation-minded shareholders may increase the frequency with which they 
reject pay packages. To be sure, it is difficult to make predictions in this area. 
However, current evidence suggests that there may not be significant cause for 
concern. While the number of negative say on pay cases increased from 2011 to 
2012, the total percentage of failed say on pay votes remained relatively small at 
2.6%.
310
 Commentators have also indicated that shareholders have refined their 
analysis of problematic pay practices,
311
 which inturn suggests that any suits based 
on these negative votes may be qualitatively better, making it easier for courts to 
provide signals regarding how directors may have fallen short of their obligations.   
D. Toward Reform 
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Article argues that Delaware 
courts should use say on pay votes to alter the standard by which they examine 
compensation decisions. Delaware courts may find that such an alteration is 
beneficial because it enables them to reestablish their prominence in this area. The 
following discussion sets forth modest and radical proposals for reform. 
1. A Modest Proposal 
Shareholders have argued that their negative say on pay votes should 
rebut the presumption afforded under Aronson that the directors’ decision resulted 
from sound business judgment and hence satisfy demand futility.
312
 This Article 
stops short of advocating that such a vote should entirely satisfy the demand 
futility rules, which is consistent with at least one court’s formulation of the pre-
suit demand requirement.
313
 Indeed, directors should not be compelled to follow 
shareholder preferences when they could prove detrimental to the best interests of 
the corporation. This is particularly true if the shareholder vote was rejected by a 
bare majority. Also, courts should take into account whether and to what extent 
directors have considered shareholder concerns when making their pay decisions. 
Hence, there may be circumstances in which directors have appropriately 
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considered shareholder concerns and thus their actions should be viewed in a 
favorable light despite a negative say on pay vote. 
Nevertheless, the negative say on pay vote should be given considerable 
weight in the demand-futility context, particularly when the percentage of negative 
votes is substantially more than a majority. As the preceding Section suggests, the 
rarity of such shareholder rejection coupled with the directors’ obligation to 
consider shareholder concerns in their decision-making process justifies giving the 
say on pay vote considerable weight in the demand-futility inquiry. Moreover, the 
potential that pay decisions will be colored by bias and other inappropriate 
influences should prevent courts from affording their traditional deference to 
director decisions in this area. In this respect, the say on pay vote not only should 
trigger reduced deference but should also carry significant weight in courts’ 
assessment regarding whether to excuse demand as futile. 
Altering the rules related to demand futility should have a significant 
impact on fiduciary duty law. Changing those rules increases the likelihood that 
shareholders can move beyond the motion to dismiss stage. As a result, such a 
change not only increases the potential for favorable settlements in this area but 
also increases the likelihood that fiduciary duty rules will deter inappropriate 
director behavior by revealing that such rules pose a credible threat of liability. 
Altering rules at the demand futility stage also may be viewed as the ideal 
response to judicial competency concerns, and thus altering such rules may have a 
better chance of being embraced. Because the demand futility assessment does not 
require courts to make an ultimate judgment either about the adequacy of the 
executive compensation at issue, or about the appropriateness of director conduct, 
there is a stronger likelihood that judges will feel comfortable applying enhanced 
scrutiny at such a stage. This is underscored by the fact that courts have been 
willing to impose more exacting scrutiny at the demand futility stage for claims 
related to excessive compensation in certain circumstances.
314
 Thus, there is 
precedent for this kind of reform. 
2. A Radical Proposal 
It is also possible that courts can use the say on pay rules to shift the 
burden of proof at the substantive stage of a say on pay lawsuit. In their say on pay 
suits, shareholders have suggested that directors should be required to prove that 
their compensation decisions are consistent with their compensation policies. 
Thus, shareholders have pinpointed corporate compensation policies as disclosed 
in the proxy statement and other public documents and have argued that particular 
compensation arrangements are inconsistent with such policies. In each case, 
although corporations purport to embrace a pay-for-performance philosophy, 
directors approve pay packages that do not make sufficient allowances for poor 
performance.
315
 In the shareholders’ view, the inconsistency between policy and 
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practice is indicative of a breach of directors’ duties. Moreover, in making this 
argument, shareholders appear to suggest that a negative say on pay vote should 
require directors to demonstrate the validity of their decisions, at least as measured 
against their purported policies. 
Consistent with such a suggestion, it is possible for Delaware (or other) 
courts to use the negative say on pay vote to shift the burden of proof so that 
directors do have to defend their pay practices. On the one hand, this Article’s 
discussion regarding the complexity of compensation decisions underscores the 
difficulty of encouraging courts to delve into the substance of compensation 
decisions. As a result, any reform that requires courts to judge the sufficiency of 
pay decisions may be viewed as problematic. On the other hand, a burden-shifting 
reform has appeal. Indeed, shareholders tend to reject pay packages at companies 
where there is a severe disconnect between pay and performance. When this 
disconnect is at odds with corporate policy, it may be reasonable to require 
directors to explain that divergence. Such a requirement will make it unnecessary 
for courts to judge the adequacy of compensation. Rather, they will assess the 
adequacy of the board’s explanations about compensation—a potentially less 
onerous task. Moreover, because shareholders tend to reject pay packages in which 
the disconnect between pay and performance is significant, it is likely that courts 
will be focused on the most egregious cases, which may make assessing those 
cases much easier. 
Of course, any reform that encourages Delaware courts to challenge 
directors’ decisions on their face, or otherwise seeks to hold directors liable for 
those decisions, faces an uphill battle. Indeed, while courts have been willing to 
apply increased rigor at the demand or procedural stage, courts have not been 
willing to overturn the substance of a compensation decision.
316
 Therefore, this 
proposal is more radical and less feasible. However, there are sufficient reasons for 
courts to enhance their scrutiny of pay arrangements, and negative say on pay 
votes offer an ideal starting point, particularly because they may represent a 
relatively small universe of cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Although outrage over excessive executive compensation has prompted 
reforms, those reforms have ignored the role of fiduciary duty law. Instead, 
executive compensation reforms have sought to enhance board accountability 
through measures outside of that law. This Article contends that such an effort is a 
mistake and insists that fiduciary duty law should play a role in curbing excessive 
executive compensation. 
Say on pay is one of the most prevalent executive compensation reforms. 
In the wake of negative say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought lawsuits 
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against directors, arguing that the negative say on pay votes indicate that such 
directors have breached their fiduciary duty. This Article argues that these lawsuits 
may present a welcome opportunity for courts to reshape fiduciary duty law and 
reconfirms that law’s relevance to the executive compensation debate. 
To be sure, courts historically have been reluctant to interfere in the 
executive pay decision. However, this Article advances several reasons why that 
interference is necessary and appropriate, particularly in the context of say on pay 
suits. Say on pay is an ideal platform for courts to reinvigorate fiduciary duty law 
related to compensation matters. Corporate governance experts believe that 
directors’ duties with respect to executive compensation include appropriately 
considering shareholder concerns. The say on pay vote is an important 
embodiment of those concerns. A negative say on pay vote is a strong signal that 
something is awry with pay practices, particularly because such votes are relatively 
rare and require that a broad cross-section of shareholders agree on the 
inappropriateness of executive pay. Because negative votes are relatively low, any 
heightened scrutiny surrounding litigation in this area will be reserved to a subset 
of companies and their compensation decisions, potentially minimizing the amount 
of litigation in this area, while enabling courts to send an important message about 
the boundaries of acceptable pay practices. Then too, because corporations 
disclose their pay practices, courts can limit their determination to whether 
particular compensation packages are consistent with such practices. Such 
limitation may be an important response to concerns that courts may be less 
equipped to judge the adequacy of given compensation packages per se. In this 
regard, say on pay offers a way for courts to play a relatively limited, albeit 
critical, role in overseeing executive pay.  
As this Article argues, Delaware courts should embrace the opportunity 
presented by say on pay for several important reasons. As an advisory measure, 
say on pay may be insufficient on its own to impact the range of problematic pay 
practices at companies simply because companies are not required to alter their 
behavior as a result of negative say on pay votes. To be sure, even if say on pay 
could do a lot of work in this space, it seems inappropriate to let fiduciary duty law 
off the hook, particularly given than courts are supposed to play a role in policing 
these decisions. And contrary to conventional wisdom suggesting that courts have 
categorically refused to pass on the sufficiency of executive pay decisions, 
empirical evidence does show that courts have been willing to apply more exacting 
scrutiny to pay decisions at least episodically. This suggests that courts are willing 
and able to play a more significant role in this area. But they just need the right 
prompts. Moreover, compensation practices likely benefit from state regulation, 
which may allow for greater flexibility in pay practices. However, state courts’ 
enforcement of fiduciary duty law is instrumental to that regulation and flexibility. 
Indeed, shareholders’ push for federal intervention may have stemmed from their 
dissatisfaction with state accountability mechanisms. From this perspective, the 
best way to ensure that states, and by extension corporations, can be laboratories 
for fostering healthy innovation (at least some of the time), is to ensure that state 
courts do a more robust job of policing those laboratories.  
